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SHARING THE GREEN:
REFORMATTING WISCONSIN’S FORGOTTEN
GREEN SPACE GRANT WITH A PUBLIC–
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP DESIGN
Despite the vast amount of legal research available on brownfields
redevelopment generally, little has been done on the value of brownfieldto-greenspace conversions. Brownfield-to-greenspace conversions that
incorporate public–private partnership elements may trigger private
investment in brownfields when the market alone fails to induce
development of contaminated lands.
Brownfield-to-greenspace
partnerships are a flexible way to redevelop brownfields and maintain
complete stakeholder involvement in the cleanup and ownership process.
Currently, an unfunded Wisconsin program is set up to provide grants to
municipalities for brownfield-to-greenspace conversions. Wisconsin
municipalities have used this grant successfully in the past to improve
local economic prospects simply by investing in small-scale brownfieldto-greenspace conversions.
This Comment breaks down why programs that encourage
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions should continue to be funded.
Investments in greenspace may be small, yet resulting economic prospects
through property-value improvements and job creation can be large in
some circumstances.
This Comment assesses how the Wisconsin
brownfield-to-greenspace program could be made more attractive and
feasible if it allowed for public–private partnership; at the moment, the
Wisconsin program is limited to municipalities and has a deed restriction
whereby private entities are not allowed to use the land associated with the
grant for a number of years. Ultimately, brownfield-to-greenspace
redevelopments may be best performed through public–private
partnerships where more stakeholders have access to funding and
influence on project developments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenarios:
x A waterway is restored and a public space is created with
flowing water connected to the adjacent river. The
surrounding office space becomes more desirable and the
vacancy rate decreases. New developments are planned
to take advantage of this new amenity.
x A park is built on a former landfill site with connections
to a network of bike paths along the local river system.
This in turn, attracts a company to relocate into the
community because they feel it will reduce employee
turnover.
x An old store with a parking lot on main street is
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converted into a plaza with some small retail space, a
café, and a public bathroom. The project creates an
outdoor gathering place that initiates a revitalization of
the area. Property owners reinvest in their buildings,
more pedestrians wander the area and new commercial
businesses move in to enjoy the scene or to capitalize on
1
the retail potential.
Each example depicts a former contaminated or blighted property that
is converted into public park space with resulting economic benefits to a
community. The number of brownfields across America is estimated to
2
be between 500,000 and 1 million. And with that number continually
rising, it is important for states to develop creative redevelopment
programs. Brownfield-to-greenspace programs are one option.
From a development standpoint, the need for remediation exists
3
because brownfields create blight and decrease property values.
However, heavy liabilities and exorbitant costs limit the attractiveness of
brownfields to private developers searching for development land on
4
the open market. Incorporating public spaces into remediation efforts
is a promising approach to redeveloping brownfields because
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions can be done resourcefully
through publicly driven efforts, and the added greenspace can provide
5
communities with unique economic benefits. The economic benefits

1. USC CTR. FOR ECON. DEV., LEVERAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT CAPITAL FOR
BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT 3–4 (2003) [hereinafter LEVERAGING
PRIVATE INVESTMENT].
2. Brownfields: Lessons From the Field: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Water
Resources & Env’t, 107th Cong. 33 (2001) (statement of Rep. Earl Blumenauer); id. at 53
(testimony of R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President, Gov’t Affairs, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce); Brownfields to Biomass: Tapping EPA’s Grant Programs, BIOMASS HUB (Apr.
20, 2010), http://www.biomasshub.com/brownfields-biomass-tapping-epa-grant-programs/.
3. See, e.g., Robert A. Simons & Jesse D. Saginor, A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of
Environmental Contamination and Positive Amenities on Residential Real Estate Values, 28 J.
REAL EST. RES. 71, 83, 97 (2006) (providing statistically significant findings that property
values decrease with closer proximity to environmental contamination); Diana A. Silva, Note,
Land Banking as a Tool for the Economic Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities,
3 DREXEL L. REV. 607, 610–11 (2011) (highlighting empirical data that showed property
values in major American cities dipping as a result of abandoned properties).
4. See infra Part II.C. Remediation expenses are largely based upon the investigations,
removals, and management of environmental cleanups. Deborah K. Tellier et al., Turning
Brown into Green: Practical Considerations for Lenders and Buyers of Contaminated Property
in a Red Economy, 27 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 20, 20 (2009).
5. CHRISTOPHER DE SOUSA, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND THE QUEST FOR
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include improved property values, added jobs, and enhanced tax bases
that result from an area’s increased attractiveness to business and
residential development.
Some community leaders consider brownfields to be the “number6
one obstacle to urban redevelopment.” Many others believe that
redeveloping brownfields is one way for urban centers to achieve
7
“economic self-sufficiency.” As a result, numerous state and local
8
initiatives have tried to tackle brownfields issues. Still, brownfield-togreenspace conversions and public–private partnership efforts may be
underutilized.
Converting brownfields into greenspace and encouraging
partnerships between public and private entities in redeveloping
brownfields could rejuvenate residential and economic areas where
“brownfields have accumulated and dragged down the quality of
9
life.” It is important to further brownfields redevelopment because a
brownfield project may “act as a catalyst for large-scale community
10
revitalization efforts.” State laws must encourage creative and efficient
ways of remediating properties, such as converting brownfields to
greenspace—and states should be careful to not strip funding away from
creative brownfields redevelopment programs proven successful in the
past.
Part II of this Comment provides background on America’s
brownfields problem, highlights reasons why communities should
cleanup and redevelop contaminated sites, and then describes the

SUSTAINABILITY 177 (2008) (highlighting that urban greenway developments “are usually
tied to a broader economic development oriented strategy that sees residential and
commercial development springing up along the greenway”).
6. Todd S. Davis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 9 (Todd S.
Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS] (noting that Cleveland’s former mayor,
Mike White, called contamination the “number-one obstacle to urban redevelopment”).
7. John C. Chambers, Community Participation in Brownfields Redevelopment, in
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 243, 245.
8. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Strategies for Implementing the Environmental
Justice Vision, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 327–28 (2007); Kris Wernstedt et al., The
Brownfields Phenomenon: Much Ado About Something or the Timing of the Shrewd? 1 (Res.
for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 04-46, 2004).
9. Juha Siikamäki & Kris Wernstedt, Turning Brownfields into Greenspaces: Examining
Incentives and Barriers to Revitalization, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 559, 559–60 (2008).
10. For EPA’s Brownfields Program, “Green” Refers to More than the Environment,
BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2003 [hereinafter More than
the Environment], available at http://epa.gov/brownfields/success/Green_Money.pdf.
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disincentives that dissuade private entities and communities from
investing in these lands. Part III first describes attempts taken by the
federal government and states to cure the shortcomings of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
11
Act (CERCLA) and then identifies innovative remediation methods
that are less often utilized. Part IV points out that municipalities have
more options than private entities to be creative through brownfield
cleanup efforts. Arguably, municipalities should use this advantage to
incorporate greenspace in redevelopment efforts because converting
brownfields to greenspace can boost economic prospects. Part V
identifies two innovative Wisconsin remediation programs—most
notably, the Wisconsin Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities
Grant Program (Green Space Grant), which presently lacks funding—
and offers examples of two Wisconsin cities that successfully converted
brownfields into greenspace with assistance from the Green Space
Grant. Finally, Part VI argues that Wisconsin must not only maintain its
brownfield-to-greenspace grant program, but also alter it to allow for
use by private entities. Ultimately, this Comment advocates for a
modified Green Space Grant that allows for public and private
cooperation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining “Brownfields” and Congress’s Initial Reaction to the
Exposure of Problematic Contaminated Properties—the Creation of
CERCLA
Brownfield properties are often characterized as “abandoned, idled,
12
The federal government’s definition of a
or under-used” sites.
brownfield is “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of
which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a
13
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” Years of industrial
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
12. Sariyah S. Buchanan, Why Marginalized Communities Should Use Community
Benefit Agreements as a Tool for Environmental Justice: Urban Renewal and Brownfield
Redevelopment in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 31, 36
(2010) (quoting Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalyst for Neighborhood
Revitalization, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2000)).
13. Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001
§ 211(a)(39)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006); see also Revitalizing Contaminated Sites—
Liability Protections for Owners and Prospective Purchasers, 26 HAZARDOUS WASTE
CONSULTANT, no. 5, 2008 at 4.2 [hereinafter Revitalizing Contaminated Sites]. Properties also
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use and contamination created numerous lots that are no longer
environmentally safe to use—and the abandonment of these properties
occurred, in part, because business owners left areas due to either
economic hardship (which caused them to close shop) or increased
suburbanization (which made developing in less-expensive outlying
14
areas more attractive than developing in older urban cores).
America’s initial worry about contaminated property started after
the 1978 disaster in Love Canal, New York. A local company’s unsafe
chemical waste disposal resulted in a “toxic soup bubbling up into the
15
16
basements” of Love Canal houses, creating a “public outcry.” As a
result of this misfortune, Congress enacted CERCLA to swiftly
remediate hazardous waste sites and to ensure that responsible parties
17
would be liable for costs: Congress intended CERCLA to clean up
may be referred to as brownfields due simply to “perceived” environmental contamination
without regard to whether environmental contamination actually exists. John S. Applegate,
Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields
Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243, 246 (1997–1998). The State of Wisconsin
tweaks the federal definition slightly, providing that brownfields means “abandoned, idle or
underused industrial or commercial facilities or sites, the expansion or redevelopment of
which is adversely affected by actual or perceived environmental contamination.” WIS. STAT.
§ 560.13 (2009–2010) (emphasis added); see also Kris Wernstedt & Robert Hersh, Brownfields
Redevelopment in Wisconsin: Program, Citywide, and Site-Level Studies 1 n.1 (Res. for the
Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-53, 2003) (noting that the Wisconsin code varies somewhat
from the federal wording). Thus, Wisconsin’s definition unambiguously includes closed
plants as brownfields; and the state has taken brownfields remediation efforts directed at
curing a growing problem of closed manufacturing facilities. For a discussion of the
Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative, see infra Part V.A.
14. Henry R. Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the Enemies Are Losing, 34
CONN. L. REV. 539, 553 (2002).
15. Michael J. Minkus, Comment, Fighting Uncertainty: Municipal Partnerships with
Redevelopment Agencies Can Mitigate Uncertainty to Encourage Brownfield Redevelopment, 1
GOLDEN GATE ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 278 & n.68 (2007) (quoting ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 311 (5th ed. 2006)). The
Hooker Chemical Company caused the Love Canal disaster. While in operation, Hooker
continually disposed of hazardous chemicals by burying drums in an old canal, sealing
chemicals with clay. Emilee Mooney Scott, Note, Bona Fide Protection: Fulfilling CERCLA’s
Legislative Purpose by Applying Differing Definitions of ‘Disposal’, 42 CONN. L. REV. 957,
965 (2010); Mike Brown, ‘Sealed Vault’ Effort Failed at Canal Site, NIAGARA GAZETTE, Aug.
9, 1978, at 1A. Afterwards, the company filled the land and sold it to a school board, and a
school and neighborhood were constructed on and around the property. Scott, supra, at 965.
Some twenty years later, heavy rainfall caused the chemical soup to seep into the homes of
neighborhood residents. Id.
16. Adam J. Sulkowski, There’s Gold in Them Thar Brownfields: The Legal Framework
of Brownfield Redevelopment and Some Tips for Getting Started, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 100, 102
(2010).
17. CAROLE STERN SWITZER & LYNN A. BULAN, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE
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hazardous waste sites while making polluters pay for the damage. 18
Congress’s response was necessary to cure the severe problem
exposed by Love Canal, but CERCLA’s benefits are not without
19
Most notably, individuals unintentionally acquiring
drawbacks.
contaminated properties may incur liability when purchasing industrial
and commercial lots and, subsequently, must spend significant funds
20
cleaning the properties to avoid penalties. This is because the liability
scheme under CERLCA is generally interpreted by courts to be joint
21
and several, strict, and retroactive, creating liability potential for most
22
of the parties involved in a property. CERCLA’s existence has scared
away not only potentially responsible parties (PRPs) explicitly liable
under its provisions, but also banks and investors typically willing to
23
Despite the disincentives to
finance developments with loans.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 3–4
(2002); Minkus, supra note 15, at 278.
18. Scott, supra note 15, at 966–67 (describing the aim of CERCLA). Under CERCLA,
there are four “parties” that may incur penalties or be responsible for cleanup:
(1) the current owner or operator of the facility; (2) the owner or operator of the
facility at the time that any hazardous substances were disposed of; (3) any person
who arranged for disposal, treatment, or transportation of hazardous substances;
and (4) any person who transported hazardous substances to the facility.
Id. at 967 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006)). Essentially, past, present, and future parties are
potentially liable even if they are not at fault. Linda McCarthy, The Brownfield Dual LandUse Policy Challenge: Reducing Barriers to Private Redevelopment While Connecting Reuse to
Broader Community Goals, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 287, 289 (2002).
19. See, e.g., Kris Wernstedt & Robert Hersh, Brownfield Policy Reform in Wisconsin: A
New Regulatory Culture, RESOURCES, Spring 2004, at 14.
20. Emily A. Green, The Rustbelt and the Revitalization of Detroit: A Commentary and
Criticism of Michigan Brownfield Legislation, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 571, 577 (2004); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1) (2006) (indicating that current owners are subject to liability under CERCLA).
Penalties for failing to comply with contaminated property regulations or cleanup orders can
be large. For example, in Wisconsin, for any violation of its Spill Statute—the statute that
governs contaminated property liability—a party will be fined up to $5000. WIS. STAT.
§ 292.99(1) (2009–2010). And each day that the property is not cleaned up is an individual
offense. Id.; Arthur J. Harrington, Wisconsin, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 985, 986.
21. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878, 1881 (2009)
(noting that an exception to joint and several liability exists if a CERCLA defendant proves
“that a reasonable basis for apportionment exists”); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160, 167, 171, 173–74 (4th Cir. 1988); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003
WI 108, ¶¶ 114–15, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257; Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra
note 13, at 4.2.
22. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.2.
23. Todd S. Davis, Brownfields Sites: Removing Lenders Concerns as a Barrier to
Redevelopment, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 116, 117, 128; see also Telephone
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redevelopment, 24 which will be elaborated on in Part II.C., it is vital that
communities understand the general reasons why brownfields
remediation is important, including what features of urban brownfields
may work to lure in private developers.
B. Why Communities Should Redevelop Brownfield Properties
Reasons for localities and community stakeholders to redevelop
contaminated properties go beyond environmental justice and public
health. Moreover, despite strong financial and liability disincentives
posed to private parties, brownfield properties can attract private
developers through location because many brownfields are in urban
areas and maintain a close proximity to population centers,
25
Redevelopment
transportation, resources, and other networks.
reasons include removing blight and its negative effects; eliminating
eyesores; gentrifying neighborhoods; creating jobs and increasing tax
revenue; decontaminating land; creating recreational options; and
reversing the present insistence of industrial and commercial entities to
develop on greenfields in outlying areas rather than land poised for
26
redevelopment in urban cores.
Interview with Mark Wendorf, Dir. of Pub. Works, City of Delavan, Wis. (Jan. 10, 2011)
(mentioning that brownfield projects “scare” banks).
24. “‘Redevelopment’ . . . means restoring the presumed future use of the site to an
industrial or commercial use.” Applegate, supra note 13, at 272. Thus, by “brownfields
redevelopment,” I am referring to the future use of brownfield properties.
25. Walter E. Mugdan, Environmental Considerations in Real Estate Transactions, in
THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: BROWNFIELDS
AND BEYOND 1665, 1667 (ALI-ABA, Course of Study, 2010) (defining location as “the
relationship of the property to population centers, transportation, and other infrastructure, its
proximity to necessary natural resources or materials, and to markets, etc.”). Location is
arguably the most important factor in real estate purchasing decisions. Id.
26. See Kris Wernstedt, Lisa Crooks & Robert Hersh, Brownfields Redevelopment in
Wisconsin: A Survey of the Field 12–13 & tbl.4 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 0354, 2003); EPA Brownfields Grants of $71 Million Will Help Address Petroleum and Other
Hazards, UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK GUIDE NEWSL. (Thompson Publ’g Group,
Tampa, Fla.), June 2008, at 1, available at 20 No. 9 USTGUIDE-NWL 5 (Westlaw) (quoting
Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Admin., Statement (Apr. 7, 2008)) (noting that redeveloping
brownfields may help the removal of eyesores); More than the Environment, supra note 10
(noting crime reduction, commercial opportunities, jobs, and property tax revenue increases).
When I refer to “greenfields,” I am referring to undeveloped property, never used for
commercial or economic activity. See, e.g., Green, supra note 20, at 571–72. This is in
contrast to “greenspace,” which I ultimately suggest brownfields should be redeveloped into.
Greenspace includes manufactured parks, recreational trails, civic plazas, seating areas,
among others, but does not include undeveloped “greenfield” sites. See, e.g., Choosing
“Greenspace” as a Brownfields Reuse, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash.,
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The most commonly considered and documented of these reasons is
27
blight. Brownfield properties that are vacant or underused hamper
28
surrounding areas with urban decay and despair and declining property
29
30
As a whole, the
values, potentially resulting in increased crime.
negative consequences of blight are detrimental to the community
31
health of areas where brownfields are prevalent.
From a financial perspective, municipalities should be especially
concerned about blight-related declines in property values that could
32
result in decreased tax revenues. Redeveloping brownfields into more
attractive or more productive land could halt plummeting property
33
Plus, those
values, which could lead to improved tax bases.
D.C.),
Oct.
2003
[hereinafter
Choosing
Greenspace],
available
at
http://epa.gov/brownfields/success/Green_Space.pdf.
27. “Blight” is a very broad term. This is demonstrated by the description of “blighted
properties” according to the State of Michigan, which includes the following array of
properties:
(1) declared a public nuisance in accordance with a municipality’s code or
ordinance, (2) an attractive nuisance to children, (3) are a fire hazard or otherwise
dangerous to public safety, (4) have had the utilities, plumbing, heating, or sewerage
permanently disconnected, destroyed, removed, or rendered ineffective so that the
property is unfit for its intended use, (5) are tax reverted, (6) are owned by a land
bank fast track authority, or (7) have substantial subsurface debris rendering the
site unfit for its intended use.
Richard A. Barr & Megan C. McCulloch, Challenging Times Call for Layered Incentives for
Distressed Properties, 36 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 125, 128 (2009) (citing and quoting MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.2652(e) (West 2006)).
28. Anne Marie Pippin, Community Involvement in Brownfield Redevelopment Makes
Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in the United States and Central and
Eastern Europe, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 596 (2009); see also Applegate, supra note
13, at 247 (mentioning that abandoned brownfields “symbolize the hazards and hopelessness
of the inner city”).
29. Pippin, supra note 28, at 592.
30. See Buchanan, supra note 12, at 32, 38 n.40; Jasleen K. Anand & Naeem Mia,
Brownfields Development: New Tools May Be Available in Your Own Backyard, PROB. &
PROP., Mar./Apr. 2010, at 43, 43 (suggesting that brownfield sites that are owned but
abandoned can pose a threat to public safety).
31. Laura L. Hunt, Reclaiming the Valley, UWM TODAY, Fall 2004, at 10–12; see also
Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14 (“[U]nattended contaminated sites may threaten
public health and the environment . . . .”).
32. Buchanan, supra note 12, at 37; Catherine J. LaCroix, Urban Agriculture & Other
Green Uses: Remaking the Shrinking City, 42 URB. LAW. 225, 229–30, 247 (2010) (indicating
that vacant lots and buildings litter blighted areas and that these abandoned parcels
contribute to decreased property values in surrounding areas).
33. Dennis A. Kaufman & Norman R. Cloutier, The Impact of Small Brownfields and
Greenspaces on Residential Property Values, 33 J. REAL EST. FIN. ECON. 19, 27–29 (2006);
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redevelopments may stimulate development in surrounding areas. 34 In
fact, urban planning professionals insist that increasing tax revenue and
35
And,
creating jobs are two key reasons to redevelop brownfields.
developing brownfields for financial gain—seen through job creation,
private economic development, increased property values, or increased
36
tax base and tax revenue —is especially relevant during poor economic
times, as the case is today. In 2000, estimates suggested that brownfields
redevelopment could create over 500,000 new jobs and generate
37
approximately $2 million in annual tax revenue, nationwide.
Arguably, job and revenue-creation estimates overshadow a
38
potential diverted-investment problem. A similar concept has been
discussed in the context of new sports facilities, where some question the
extent of revenue generated when a city builds a new sports facility to

Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields Programs Can’t
Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 RUT. L. REV. 1075,
1079 (1999); How Does Your Garden Grow? Brownfields Redevelopment and Local
Agriculture, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2009, at 3,
available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/local_ag.pdf (“A Philadelphia area study
estimated that vacant land improvements result in a 30% increase in surrounding property
values.”).
34. See ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE
LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 356 (2000).
35. Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh, supra note 26, at 13 tbl.4 (reporting results from a
survey of professionals in the field). To be sure, urban planning professionals may be biased
in their views on the reasons to redevelop brownfields in that they may not share the same
goals as private-practice developers. For comparison, see DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 35,
where the author presents a study of the reasons private-sector stakeholders think
brownfields redevelopment is important. According to that study, profit maximization was
the largest motivating factor, whereas job creation and tax restoration were on the low end of
economic reasons. Id. at 35 tbl.2.3.
36. See Espinosa, supra note 12, at 3.
37. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 287 (detailing that the U.S. Conference of Mayors
estimated in 2000 that brownfields redevelopment would create 550,000 jobs and $2.4 million
in annual tax revenue); Brownfields Redevelopment Could Generate 575,000 Jobs, $1.9 Billion
in Annual Revenue, Report Says, HDR CURRENT DEVS. (West, Eagan, Minn.), July 7, 2003,
at 1, available at 31 No. CD-14 HDRCURDEV 20 (Westlaw).
38. By diverted investment, I am referring to money that existing private entities use to
relocate and pay taxes and salaries at a separate location within the same city—that is, money
that was already being spent on taxes and salaries at an existing site in a city that might be
used by the same private entity upon relocating to a newly-cleaned, more attractive space that
was once a brownfield. Cf. Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are They
Economically Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U. MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 483, 512–13 (2002) (explaining “diverted entertainment spending,” which refers to
money that citizens once spent on existing entertainment options within a city, but would shift
to a different entertainment option if a new sports facility is built).
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replace an old one. 39 If redevelopment efforts fail to attract additional
investment, and instead merely prompt local entities to move from one
side of town to the other, then no new money is directly created because
the “investments” made into the city are just being diverted across town.
However, cities should balance this potential pitfall with the potential
for local reinvestment and new outside investment that could result
40
when blighted properties become more attractive. Moreover, quality
of life improvements, through added park space and sprawl-reduction
measures, could help some previously-decaying cities lure developers in
41
from outlying areas.
In addition, dual benefits are possible through greenspace
42
redevelopment projects that focus on recreation and public health.
Greenspaces, such as parks, watersheds, and forested areas, meet “clean
property” standards and public health goals for two reasons: (1)
greenspaces do not further contaminate land because greenspaces lack
chemical or residue output that might seep into the ground, and (2)
people spend “less time” on greenspaces than on other properties and,

39. Parlow, supra note 38, at 512 (explaining that new sports facilities might not generate
“any ‘new’ revenue”). It has been argued that replacement sports facilities simply
“maintain[] economic activity at or near its former level.” Id.
40. See Sara C. Galvan, Note, Rehabilitating Rehab Through State Building Codes, 115
YALE L.J. 1744, 1757 (2006). For comparison, in the context of new sports facilities, a city
creates new jobs and tax revenue if the replaced arena was in a neighboring city. See Parlow,
supra note 38, at 541 & n.308.
41. Pulling in companies from other, neighboring cities would create “new” jobs and tax
revenue. See Parlow, supra note 38, at 541 & n.308 (suggesting that the City of Los Angeles
created “new” jobs and tax revenue by building the Staples Center because “arena-related
events” shifted from Inglewood to Los Angeles).
42. One example is through the production of bioswells or storm-water retention spaces.
Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Building Livable Places: The Importance of Landscape in Urban
Land Use, Planning, and Development, 16 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 108–09 (2008–2009).
Milwaukee’s Stormwater Park is a prime example. The City of Milwaukee used grant money
to develop a park in the Menomonee Valley that works as a water cleansing facility by
gradually cleaning storm-water run off of nearby industrial facilities before it hits the city’s
Menomonee River. Menomonee Valley—Stormwater Park, REMEDIATION & REDEV.
PROGRAM
(Wis.
DNR,
Madison,
Wis.),
Jan.
2009,
available
at
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/RR827.pdf; Telephone Interview with David Misky,
Assistant Exec. Dir.—Sec’y, Redev. Auth. of the City of Milwaukee (Dec. 28, 2010).
Stormwater Park sits on land that was once home to the CMC Milwaukee Road Shops.
Menomonee Valley—Stormwater Park, supra; Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra.
Approximately 133 acres were severely contaminated, but, through numerous grants, seventy
acres were converted to greenspace that naturally cleanses storm-water and adds to the
beautification of the area. Menomonee Valley—Stormwater Park, supra; Telephone
Interview with David Misky, supra.
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thus, are less exposed to environmental harms. 43 Consequently,
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions provide recreational options for
44
neighborhoods, improved community health and lifestyle, and overall
45
benefits that traditional redevelopment methods lack.
46
Economic gain is also possible if developers recognize that areas
enhanced by attractive features are better suited for bringing in
47
and the added greenspace will make surroundings
business;
48
If adequate grants and tax incentives are
environmentally safe.
available to offset cleanup costs, then municipally-driven greenspace
redevelopment could enhance the prospects of local job growth and
49
Even further,
economic activity by removing vacant eyesores.
development indirectly triggered by added greenspaces may add to the
50
tax base and create jobs, with the new park space potentially increasing
51
property values of adjacent lots as well. “[P]arks can be presented as
43. See Applegate, supra note 13, at 271.
44. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 559–60.
45. See Vanessa Russell-Evans & Carl S. Hacker, Expanding Waistlines and Expanding
Cities: Urban Sprawl and Its Impact on Obesity, How the Adoption of Smart Growth Statutes
Can Build Healthier and More Active Communities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 79–80 (2011)
(noting that “adding attractive green spaces [may] . . . increase recreational activity”);
Greenspace Uses for Brownfields Properties: It Is Easy Being Green, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS
STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), July 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Greenspace Uses], available at
http://134.67.99.207/brownfields/success/greenspace_ss_071310.pdf (highlighting “aesthetic
appeal, restored natural habitat, and outdoor recreational options,” as examples).
46. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 177, 181; Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 96,
115 (arguing that park development is a tool for urban economic health because urban parks
create increased property values and improved consumer behavior). Economic benefits of
increased property values due to park proximity are likely less apparent on their face than
more visible economic benefits from real estate projects.
47. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 115.
48. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 569–70.
49. Id. at 588. However, some will caution that greenspace in urban or blighted areas
must not go unused or misused because this could bring adverse effects, such as criminal
activity, and could actually advance many of the problems that greenspace initiatives often
intend to fix. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 103–04.
50. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 560. This, of course, is a benefit that could
take years to surface.
51. It has long been recognized that adding park space will increase the value of adjacent
properties. Federal courts established this principle in condemnation and land use debates in
the 1800s. See, e.g., Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U.S. 611, 617 (1898) (“Whatever tends to increase
the attractiveness of the city . . . will operate to enhance the value of the private property
situated therein or adjacent thereto.”); Kerr v. South Park Comm’rs, 117 U.S. 379, 385–87
(1886) (recognizing that lands adjacent to a proposed park likely received special benefits and
increased in value as a consequence of that park prospectively being established). Park
developments may impact the value of property up to 2000 feet away. DE SOUSA, supra note
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catalysts for urban revitalization and[,] . . . [u]ltimately, America’s urban
parks are increasingly viewed as essential for many cities in their drive
to market their quality of life, whether for urban neighborhoods,
52
commercial developments, or the city as a whole.”
Redeveloping brownfields may also reduce sprawl, or “low-density,
land-consuming, automobile-dependent, haphazard, non-contiguous (or
‘leapfrog’) development on the fringe of settled areas, often near a
deteriorating central city or town, that intrudes into rural or other
53
undeveloped areas.” Many suggest that the “sprawling” of America’s
metropolitan areas is a growing problem because sprawl reduces the
54
efficiency of cities and causes pollution. In fact, sprawl reduction is
55
part of a wider community interest in curbing the brownfields problem.
Brownfields redevelopment and “smart-growth” principles coexist as
56
ways to balance environmental protection with economic progress.

5, at 165. In fact, one study showed that the property value of lots located near park
developments rose roughly 80%–100% on average. Id. at 167 (citing a 2001 study by the
International Economic Development Council).
52. DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 158.
53. Timothy J. Dowling, Point/Counterpoint, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart
Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000); see also DE SOUSA,
supra note 5, at 26 (highlighting the characteristics of sprawl); Edward T. Canuel, Supporting
Smart Growth Legislation and Audits: An Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Land Planning
Theories and Tools, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 309, 310 (2005).
54. See John Sarkis Reshwan, Crossing the Threshold of Urban Mobility and
Redevelopment: Using Tax Allocation Districts to Develop the Atlanta Beltline, 23 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 681, 684–85 (2007) (noting that brownfields redevelopment could alleviate traffic
congestion); Russell-Evans & Hacker, supra, note 45, at 64–65, 95–97 (noting sprawl’s impact
on public health and community-wide amenities). Further effects of sprawl include “real
estate price stagnation, tax rate increases, escalating shopping center vacancy rates, and
schools falling into disrepair.” Canuel, supra note 53, at 312. The idea of “school disrepair”
strikes home with the City of Milwaukee, a brownfields haven whose public school system
continually brandishes intolerable graduation rates and declining attendance. See, e.g., Erin
Richards, MPS, Voucher Students Boost Graduation Rates, JSONLINE (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/113253444.html (highlighting that the high school
graduation rate in the Milwaukee public school system is between 60% and 70%). Further
research should be done to consider the effect that brownfields redevelopments and the
coinciding fixes to local neighborhoods could have on the attractiveness and effectiveness of
struggling urban school systems. Indeed, a recent article suggests that school systems could
improve if neighborhood remediation efforts attract more residents. Julie A. Tappendorf &
Brent O. Denzin, Turning Vacant Properties into Community Assets Through Land Banking,
43 URB. LAW. 801, 801–02 (2011) (“[L]ocal schools benefit because they receive more
funding when there is an increase in property owners in their school districts.”).
55. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 288.
56. Canuel, supra note 53, at 313–14.
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“Sustainable development” 57 ensures quality of life and opportunity for
58
present and future generations. Communities interested in sustainable
development and smart-growth initiatives—and, likewise, the reduction
59
of sprawl—could consider redeveloping brownfields as a way to keep
60
urban development attractive. Indeed, brownfields redevelopment is
61
designed to meet sustainable goals if (1) the public is involved; (2)
decisions are integrated with social, health, economic, and
environmental issues; and (3) outcomes are measured in terms of smart62
growth.
Finally, states should not ignore the attractive features that
brownfield properties may present to private developers. The focus
63
Urban properties often have access to
here is on location.
64
comprehensive transportation networks and the larger populations and

57. John C. Dernbach & Scott Bernstein, Pursuing Sustainable Communities: Looking
Back, Looking Forward, 35 URB. LAW. 495, 497 (2003) (“[S]ustainable communities are
‘cities and towns that prosper because people work together to produce a high quality of life
that they want to sustain and constantly improve. They are communities that flourish because
they build a mutually supportive, dynamic balance between social well-being, economic
opportunity, and environmental quality.’” (quoting PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE
DEV., SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES TASK FORCE REP. 2 (1997), available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/PCSD/Publications/suscomm/ind_suscom.html)).
Sustainable
property reuse is a main objective of the EPA’s Brownfields Program. Greenspace Uses,
supra note 45, at 3.
58. Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 57, at 496, 528. Building “quality of life” is one of
the principle objectives of sustainable development. Id. at 496.
59. Id. at 509. It is also seen as a way to preserve outlying greenfield and rural areas
where development is cheaper and becoming increasingly popular. See Choosing Greenspace,
supra note 26 (“An estimated 4.5 acres of greenfields are preserved for every one acre of
brownfields redeveloped.”).
60. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14 (suggesting that not developing vacant
brownfields may “push new development to rural or greenfield sites”).
61. For discussions on the importance of public involvement in brownfields
redevelopment, see infra Parts IV & VI.A.
62. Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Development: From Individual Sites to Smart Growth,
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS, Apr. 2009, at 10287–88. It is arguable that states
underutilize their policy powers in forming regimes designed to trigger urban development
rather than greenfield development in sprawled-out areas. See Lavea Brachman, Legislating
Sustainable Design: The Challenge of Local Control and Political Will, ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS
& ANALYSIS, Aug. 2010, at 10740, 10740 (“As the result of either state inaction or proactive
statutory regimes, an uneven playing field has emerged that encourages unsustainable
development in several ways beyond the construction and design context, including
encouraging greenfields development and sprawl over adaptive reuse, urban infill or
brownfield redevelopment . . . .”).
63. Applegate, supra note 13, at 248.
64. Paul Syms, Redeveloping Brownfield Land: The Decision-Making Process, 17 J.
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“customer bases” that exist in denser areas. 65 It is likely that the
environmental liability and cleanup costs could outweigh the “savings”
established by obtaining an urban property. Still, the location of urban
brownfields could be a selling point to certain developers that desire
attributes of denser cities.
The reasons for communities to redevelop brownfields are plentiful.
If financial incentives are properly in place, brownfields redevelopment
could substantially increase jobs, tax bases, and public health, while also
reducing crime and removing blight. Unfortunately, strong disincentives
dissuade development by both communities and private developers,
which can result in neither public nor private entities realizing the
positive benefits to redeveloping brownfield properties.
C. Disincentives for Private Entities and Municipalities to Redevelop
Brownfields
Many of the reasons for redeveloping brownfields, and the
subsequent benefits, are never realized because extreme disincentives
crush potential developments. Brownfields redevelopment is expensive
66
67
for municipalities and private developers. Private firms continually
show concern for environmental status and even greater concern about
68
Notably, a 2003 survey showed that Wisconsin
potential liability.
professionals involved in the field think that the high cost of cleanup is
69
the primary constraint to redeveloping brownfields.

PROP. INV. & FIN. 481, 482 (1999).
65. Id.; DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 224.
66. Brownfields Redevelopment Could Generate 575,000 Jobs, $1.9 Billion in Annual
Revenue, Report Says, supra note 37 (indicating that a majority of cities cite limited cleanup
funds as the leading impediment to brownfields redevelopment).
67. See DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 53–61; see also Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh, supra
note 26, at 15–16 & tbl.5 (highlighting a survey result that showed “high cost of clean-up” to
be the most selected “important” or “very important” constraint to brownfields
redevelopment).
68. Robertson, supra note 33, at 1108, 1118; see also Buchanan, supra note 12, at 37–38;
Sulkowski, supra note 16, at 101 (“Three factors that have discouraged [brownfields]
redevelopment . . . are a lack of clean-up funds, liability concerns, and a need for
environmental assessments.”).
69. Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh, supra note 26, at 16 tbl.5. But see Larry Schnapf, How
the CERCLA Notification Requirements Facilitate the Creation of Brownfields and What EPA
Can Do to Address This Problem, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 19, 23 (2010)
(indicating that some empirical evidence has suggested that cleanup costs are a non-factor
because those costs represent a small fraction of a property’s redevelopment value).
Interestingly, in the 2003 Wisconsin survey, very few respondents indicated that a lack of
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Without environmental regulations, the disincentives might not be
so high. To be sure, I am not suggesting that regulations and liabilities
should be completely ignored—but the regulations may be the main
reason for financial burdens because of the heavy liabilities and
70
penalties they impose. Presently, protection from liability (through
measures like insurance), cleanup requirements, and the unavoidable
delay in production by attempting to satisfy current law create
71
burdensome costs. Arguably, loosening the present requirements and
72
liabilities could facilitate redevelopment through reduced expenses.
Recall that liability under CERCLA is joint and several, strict, and
73
CERCLA’s overall severity was eased when the
retroactive.
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 created the
74
PRP right to contribution, but many developers are still frightened
75
away by the heavy standards and potential litigation costs. Certain

cooperation between the public and private sector was an issue. Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh,
supra, at 16 tbl.5. This suggests that public–private cooperation may be feasible.
70. Applegate, supra note 13, at 243–44 (mentioning that environmental regulation has a
lot to do with the unattractiveness of developing brownfield properties); Larry Schnapf,
Playing Poker with Pollution: Why It Is Time to Change the CERCLA Reporting Obligations,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2011, at 8, 9 (“The conventional narrative has been that
CERCLA liability has led to the creation of brownfields because purchasers and lenders were
concerned about remediation costs.”). The reason for high costs associated with brownfields
cleanup likely stems far beyond the CERCLA regulations though. See Schnapf, supra, at 9.
Some even argue that a lack of reporting requirements may have as much to do with the high
costs and concerns as the regulations. See id. (suggesting that limited reporting requirements
allow property owners to abandon sites without contributing to remediation).
71. Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 283 (1997).
72. Applegate, supra note 13, at 247. But see Buchanan, supra note 12, at 41 (arguing
that one risk of relaxed liability standards is taking away the ability of adversely affected
parties to achieve recourse against wrongdoing developers). Some even believe that legal
barriers to implementing green infrastructure should be removed. Alexandra Dapolito Dunn,
Siting Green Infrastructure: Legal and Policy Solutions to Alleviate Urban Poverty and
Promote Healthy Communities, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 41, 66 (2010) (“[I]t is essential
for our legal systems to remove barriers to green infrastructure implementation, for
regulators and enforcers to promote its acceptance, and for public advocates and policy
makers to embrace its incorporation into urban design and planning, particularly in distressed
communities.”).
73. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 21; Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13,
at 4.2.
74. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 § 113(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (2006); Pippin, supra note 28, at 595 (recognizing that The Superfund Amendment
& Reauthorization Act of 1986 eased the liability prevalence and severity imposed by
CERCLA).
75. See Pippin, supra note 28, at 595.
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purchasers may be shielded from liability, but any protection from
76
State-specific mini-Superfund laws
CERCLA is hard to come by.
77
create CERCLA-like liability and financing detriments; thus, financial
disincentives can be a product of both state laws and federal regulations.
Creditors are hesitant to fund brownfield projects as well. Because
of the risks associated with brownfields, it may be difficult to secure
78
outside financing for a project. Lenders are affected by environmental
regulations because of the potential responsibility for cleanup or toxic
79
tort costs, the harm that association with poor properties could bring to
their reputations as creditors, and the risk of losing payments because a
debtor-developer’s need to fund liability debts may restrict their ability
80
to meet the lender’s loan obligations. Even further, because of their

76. See generally Larry Schnapf, Counseling the Client on the CERCLA Windfall Lien,
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 2004. CERCLA traditionally provided defenses only upon
acts of God, acts of war, or third-party acts or omissions. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2006).
CERCLA amendments created a few new defenses for the following entities: (1) bona fide
prospective purchasers (BFPP), (2) contiguous property owners, and (3) innocent
landowners. Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 21. For example, the BFPP defense allows certain
landowners that were aware of contamination to be free of liability if they meet certain
criteria, such as if they took appropriate contamination inquiries and were not affiliated with
parties that were responsible for the contamination. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2006); see also
Schnapf, supra, at 39–40 (arguing that it is appropriate for BFPP’s that conduct adequate
inquiries to avoid responsibility for response costs). However, even with BFPP status, the
EPA will capture any increase in property value gained due to EPA-funded cleanup actions.
Schnapf, supra, at 48.
77. Abrams, supra note 71, at 284, 287.
78. See Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23, during which the
interviewee insisted that banks are simply frightened by brownfields redevelopment projects
and suggested that many redevelopment projects, especially during the recession, cannot get
off the ground because private investors cannot secure bank financing.
79. Lenders risk liability for costs associated with environmental cleanup if they
participate in the managerial operations of a “vessel or facility” causing contamination or by
exercising decisionmaking control over a vessel or facility’s environmental matters. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(E)–(F), 9607(a)(1) (2006); Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 23. However, a
lender not participating in management will not be held out as a PRP. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(2)(E); Matthew H. Ahrens & David S. Langer, Lender Liability Under CERCLA:
Environmental Risks for Lenders Under Superfund: A Refresher for the Economic Downturn,
3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 482, 483, 484 (2008). See Ahrens & Langer, supra, at 485–88, for a
breakdown of what it means to “participate in management.”
80. Lawrence P. Schnapf, Lender Liability Today Under Environmental Laws, 60
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 147, 147 (2006); Alexander Maro, Note, Outsourcing the Filth:
Privatizing Brownfield Remediation in New Jersey, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 159, 168
(2011) (“[L]enders are less likely to lend money to developers for two distinct reasons: the
inability for a lender to foreclose on a polluted property used as collateral in a secured
transaction, and the general disinterest in lending to developers that have the potential to be
driven into bankruptcy during a forced [transaction].”). In 2003, one out of every ten banks
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fear of working with contaminated properties, banks will exercise
81
greater caution with properties that are simply near brownfields.
Location may also be a disincentive—even in light of the benefits
that were described in Part II.B. Many developers might rather use a
greenfield site in the outskirts. Higher urban tax rates and property
values push private investment to the fringe of older industrial cities, so
developing on a brownfield rather than a greenfield likely requires a
82
very high return on profit to be worthwhile. One study shows that
greenfield developments incur higher maintenance and operating costs
than brownfield developments in just two areas: transportation and
83
However, overall cleanup can push brownfields
infrastructure.
redevelopment costs to $100,000 more than greenfield development
84
costs for the same project. The urban infrastructure or transportation
experienced losses due to environmental issues with almost 75% occurring because of
contaminated properties. Schnapf, supra, at 147–48. Lenders are not automatically PRPs and
CERCLA affords liability protection to lenders, id. at 148, but this does not protect lenders
from their own risky investments and money lost because debtors failed to meet obligations,
see Robertson, supra note 33, at 1085–86, 1088 (“Lenders worry about the potential
devaluation of a contaminated property, as well as the impact that property may have on the
borrower’s financial stability. . . . [While b]rownfields are ‘uncontrollable’ because the
associated risks are imposed and controlled by ‘others’ . . . .”).
81. Davis, supra note 23, at 117. “As lending institutions learned more about Superfund
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s they stayed away in droves from association with any
brownfields property.” Mugdan, supra note 25, at 1675.
82. Richmond, supra note 14, at 556; see also B. Robert Amjad & Adam Fishman,
Acquisition Considerations for Brownfields Properties, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 68,
72 (suggesting that the need for riskier brownfields redevelopments to have higher rates of
return than greenfield developments is comparable to how corporate bonds require higher
rates of return than government bonds).
83. Abrams, supra note 71, at 278 tbl.1, 284 (indicating that transportation and
infrastructure costs generally could be less with brownfields redevelopment than with
greenfield development, but mentioning that a “brownfields redevelopment will almost
invariably be more costly” despite this). Abrams comes to this conclusion without
recognizing that existing infrastructure will likely be dilapidated and potentially must be torn
down at an expensive price.
84. See LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 9:33
(2010) (noting that on average it takes $250,000 to clean up a brownfield site); Abrams, supra
note 71, at 280 (noting that “the cost differential for large projects is beyond the ‘several
thousand dollar per acre’ range”); Christopher De Sousa, Brownfield Redevelopment Versus
Greenfield Development: A Private Sector Perspective on the Costs and Risks Associated with
Brownfield Redevelopment in the Greater Toronto Area, 43 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 831,
841–43 & tbls.5–6 (2000) (finding, in a hypothetical cost-comparison of industrial and
residential developments on equally sized brownfield and greenfield properties, that
development costs were always higher with brownfields); Robertson, supra note 33, at 1089–
90 (highlighting one developer that spent $225,000 for site preparation for a project that
would have only cost $40,000 in site prep at a greenfield location).
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savings are often trumped by impending liability and cleanup costs, so,
given the number of other categories to consider, it is unlikely that these
two categories could persuade a developer to use a brownfield rather
85
than a greenfield.
Even further, the procedural considerations for remediating
brownfields can be overbearing. Procedural considerations include the
end use of the property; the information on past uses and potential
contamination; the availability of liability protections, such as the BFPP
protection; the level of government to consult about cleanup; the state
tools, incentives, programs, or grants that may be needed or could be
used; and the level of involvement by the United States Environmental
86
Protection Agency (EPA) or relevant state agency.
With a plethora of disincentives, it is important to consider ways to
make brownfields redevelopment more attractive. Doing so first
requires an understanding of what CERCLA-fixes have already been
implemented or contemplated.
III. FEDERAL AND STATE ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE DISINCENTIVES
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE COOPERATION
Creative and innovative ways to spur brownfields redevelopment are
required to combat the present financial disincentives. This Part first
addresses the primary federal fixes to redevelopment problems that
relate to CERCLA. It then briefly discusses some common methods to
cure brownfields issues that states have implemented or contemplated
and ultimately points out some innovative methods that are less
established.
A. Federal Involvement Through the Brownfields Act and the EPA
One of the first federal maneuvers to redirect the brownfields
problem was the 1994 Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Initiative
87
(BERI). This initiative offered certain developers grant money and
attempted to lure industrial developers away from rural development
88
sites and back to the urban core. However, BERI, while still existing,

85. Abrams, supra note 71, at 278 tbl.1 (mentioning other categories, including land cost,
debris removal, taxes, insurance, and zoning).
86. See Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.1.
87. Pippin, supra note 28, at 597.
88. Press Release, U.S. EPA, NTC Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative
(Nov. 9, 1994), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ee765cb97fbff562852572a000651fdf
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never provided enough to effectively move redevelopment forward in
89
light of CERCLA.
Far more successful was The Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act (Small Business Act), enacted by
Congress in 2001, which includes the Brownfields Revitalization and
90
These Acts
Environmental Restoration Act (Brownfields Act).
focused on fixing certain CERCLA shortcomings that prevented
91
successful brownfields redevelopment. The Brownfields Act provided
92
more financing and liability relief to parties involved in cleanup, with
financing occurring in three ways: (1) grants for environmental
assessments, (2) grants to establish a revolving loan-fund at the state or
93
local level, and (3) cleanup awards.
Administratively, the EPA maintains grants for those seeking site
94
assessment and cleanup support. However, obtaining an EPA grant is
95
very competitive. The EPA also maintains a National Priorities List
(NPL) through which it facilitates cleanup efforts and assesses liability

/8187e49f2a3507248525646d007742be!OpenDocument.
89. Id. BERI’s ineffectiveness could be because of its strict requirements. Proposed
projects had to present the following:
[A] demonstrated commitment of public and private leadership to brownfields
redevelopment; plans for effective community involvement; a clear delineation of
how federal support will make a significant difference; a potential for national
replication; local government support and technical, legal and political capacity to
complete goals; clearly outlined potential sources of cleanup funding; contributions
to environmental justice goals; and a well-defined approach to environmental
assessment.
Id.
90. See Pub. L. No. 107-118, §§ 201–231, 115 Stat. 2360, 2360–81 (2002).
91. See id.; Minkus, supra note 15, at 279–80; Pippin, supra note 28, at 599.
92. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 15 (explaining that the Brownfields Act
provided $200 million annually for site assessment and cleanup grants and $50 million for
state programs). However, the Brownfields Act deflected much of the remediation control to
state voluntary cleanup programs. Maro, supra note 80, at 170.
93. Pippin, supra note 28, at 599. Private entities could receive up to $200,000, whereas
municipalities could be awarded up to $1 million. Id.
94. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.9 tbl.2.
Brownfields
95. LEVERAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
redevelopment funding is also obtainable through the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). Id. In fact, $17.5 million in funding was available for 2010 through
HUD’s Brownfield Economic Development Initiative. BEDI Quick Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUSING AND URB. DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/economicdevelopment/programs/
bedi/bedifacts.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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for the most problematic properties. 96 However, an abundance of “less
contaminated” properties are still liable under CERCLA despite not
97
being on the NPL. As a whole, state initiatives are necessary to service
the hundreds of thousands of less contaminated sites.
B. State and Local Measures
The majority of brownfields initiatives, provisions, and supports are
98
99
state specific. States have adopted their own “Superfund” plans, and
have become increasingly creative in finding ways to cure brownfield
problems.
The most popular state-created support systems are voluntary
100
cleanup programs (VCP). These are state-funded programs that work
to limit developer liability and provide incentives for private
101
VCPs often have secondary
development, such as loans and grants.
102
objectives, such as curtailing sprawl, and are directed at sites with
103
lower contamination or risk levels that are not Superfund-eligible.

96. For basic information on the NPL, see National Priorities List (NPL), U.S. EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
97. Pippin, supra note 28, at 591, 595 (indicating that there are roughly 500,000
brownfield properties throughout the country and very few reach the contamination levels
necessary for inclusion on the National Priorities List for subsequent Superfund support).
The NPL’s “Superfund” list contains only the most contaminated brownfields and in 2002
contained between 1000 and 1500 of the estimated over 500,000 brownfield sites existing at
that time. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 287.
98. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14; Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 21
(indicating that a “tenet” of brownfields amendments has been that states should spearhead
brownfields remediation efforts).
99. Abrams, supra note 71, at 287 (indicating though that state-specific Superfund plans
can be just as burdensome and difficult to work with as CERCLA).
100. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 11 (mentioning that over forty-five states have
implemented voluntary cleanup programs, up from thirty in 1997); McCarthy, supra note 18,
at 290 (mentioning that by 2002 more than forty-five states had “voluntary action programs”);
Daniel Schlesinger, Comment, Revisiting New York’s Brownfield Cleanup Program: An
Analysis of a Voluntary Cleanup Program that Lost Its Way, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 403, 408
(2010) (noting most states have created their own voluntary cleanup programs); Wernstedt &
Hersh, supra note 19, at 15 (“All but a handful [of states] have developed formal voluntary
cleanup or brownfield programs that operate in a less burdensome and more voluntary
fashion to proactively encourage redevelopment.”).
101. Canuel, supra note 53, at 342–43.
102. See, e.g., id. (noting that one objective of a Maryland act that contained a voluntary
cleanup program was to reduce sprawl).
103. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.3–4.4; Maro, supra note 80, at
171 (noting that New Jersey’s voluntary cleanup program is designed for sites not on
Superfund’s priority list).
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Another popular method is tax incremental financing (TIF).104
Through TIF plans, subsequent tax revenue increases that are triggered
by private developments are sent to developers to help pay off any debt
105
incurred by their projects. The local government would designate an
area for development while using subsequent rises in property taxes to
106
pay off its own previous investments or pay back private investors.
However, TIF plans fail unless area property values increase or adjacent
development is triggered because, without property values moving up or
new investment moving in, the municipality funding the TIF never
107
increases its ability to generate tax revenue at a higher rate.
An additional, fairly routine form of assistance is environmental
108
Using environmental insurance relieves uncertainty over
insurance.
109
cleanup costs, and environmental-specific insurance policies, called
Contamination Legal Liability policies, have reduced remediation
110
However, the insurance method is still less utilized than TIFs
costs.
and VCPs, and often is an expensive protection. Further, many factors

104. Minkus, supra note 15, at 301; see also Barr & McCulloch, supra note 27, at 128
(noting that TIF districts are the main brownfields weapon in Michigan).
105. Canuel, supra note 53, at 316 & n.40. “A TIF plan allows a local unit of
government to freeze the amount of assessed property values in an underdeveloped or
distressed area that is retained by that local unit, and apply any increases in property tax
revenues due to increases in value to finance [area] improvement projects . . . .” Laura M.
Bassett, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Redevelopment: Attracting Private Investment
to Serve a Public Purpose—The Example of Michigan, 41 URB. LAW. 755, 757 (2009). TIF
plans used to be limited to blighted areas, but now are more widely available. See WIS. STAT.
§ 66.1105(4)(gm)(4)(bm) (2009–2010) (indicating that in Wisconsin, “the project costs [must]
relate directly to eliminating blight, directly serve to rehabilitate or conserve the area or
directly serve to promote industrial development”). Now, TIFs are generally intended for
areas that have been unable to attract private development. Bassett, supra, at 763. Even
further, TIF plans have been recognized as promoting a public purpose. Id. at 757, 769–70,
774–76 (“The use of TIF funds to finance these improvements . . . arguably promotes the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality under the generally recognized definition
of public purpose.”). Michigan courts previously held that preparing land for economic
development and working to enhance tax bases are community actions that have public
purposes. See City of Mt. Pleasant v. State Tax Comm’n, 729 N.W.2d 833, 835–36, 38 (Mich.
2007).
106. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 17.
107. See Bassett, supra note 105, at 759 (highlighting that TIF plans rely on increases in
property values).
108. Minkus, supra note 15, at 291–93; Arthur J. Harrington, Environmental Insurance:
A Business Lawyer’s Guide, WIS. LAW., May 2007, at 14, 14, 16.
109. William McElroy & Todd S. Davis, Environmental Insurance in the Brownfields
Transaction, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 155, 157.
110. Harrington, supra note 108, at 14, 16–17, 58–60.
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affect the “utility” of environmental insurance, “including the types of
coverage available, the dollar limits on claims, the policy time limits, site
111
While
assessment requirements, and costs for available products.”
environmental insurance is encouraged, the procedure to obtain it can
112
be complex.
Lastly, a simple inventory of brownfield sites accelerates the cleanup
113
Milwaukee
process by making brownfields easier to identify.
maintains a directory of tax-delinquent brownfields on the city’s
website, but lacks a complete inventory of the many contaminated
114
properties it hosts. A legislative mandate that requires municipalities
to maintain brownfields inventories could improve risk communication
115
Inventories could be
and reduce delays in decisionmaking.
particularly helpful for less contaminated sites where environmental
116
issues may be less recognizable and for providing the public with
117
better access to information.
Many insist that the key to successful brownfields redevelopment is
balancing the state and environmentalist interests with developer
118
This entails balancing environmental health interests,
interests.
including cleaner commerce and industry, with developer interests in
cost-conscious and efficient development. To meet this balance, a
growing number of state-specific initiatives attempt to incorporate all or
111. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.8. But see McElroy & Davis,
supra note 109, at 161 (mentioning that environmental insurance has become more affordable
since the late 1990s); Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 26 (“The role of insurance in [b]rownfields
development has increased significantly in recent years . . . .”).
112. Wisconsin has statutorily created an environmental insurance option for
developers. WIS. STAT. § 292.53 (2009–2010). The Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (WDNR) provides a walk-through of the complex application and qualification
process, which requires costly phase one and phase two environmental assessments as
prerequisites.
Wisconsin
Brownfields
Insurance
Program,
WIS.
DNR,
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/wbip.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
113. Seth Schofield, In Search of the Institution in Institutional Controls: The Failure of
the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 and the Need for
Federal Legislation, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 946, 1015–16 (2005).
114. Brownfields Redevelopment Site Inventory, CITY OF MILWAUKEE: DEP’T OF CITY
DEV., http://www.mkedcd.org/brownfields/bfsites.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
115. Schofield, supra note 113, at 1016; Schnapf, supra note 69, at 19. Some suggest that
CERCLA could require reporting by placing a “mandatory obligation on property owners to
investigate suspected releases and disclose the existence of contamination that exceeds
unrestricted cleanup standards.” Schnapf, supra, at 22.
116. See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 289–90.
117. See generally Schnapf, supra note 69.
118. Minkus, supra note 15, at 272–73.
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some of the methods described above. 119 If brownfield properties could
120
be more attractive with subsidized costs or more information, then it is
important for state initiatives to take creative and broad-based
approaches that support public and private, community-specific,
cooperation.
C. Creative Use of Public–Private Partnerships
The best way to facilitate brownfields redevelopment may be for
public and private entities to work together through public–private
partnerships (PPPs). Municipalities with available resources often opt
121
to cleanup brownfield sites, so they could use these resources to find
122
One
ways to work with private developers to create coordination.
contemplated measure has been for municipalities and private
123
developers to share liability or profits. Others insist on a PPP whereby
a municipality provides funds for public-use developments coordinated
124
with outside parties who construct infill projects at adjacent properties.
119. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & M. Katherine Kraft, Editor’s Note, Active Living,
the Built Environment, and the Policy Agenda, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 371, 379 (2008)
(describing Boston’s “Boston Schoolyard Initiative,” which is meant to transform old and
unused Boston area schoolyards into usable greenspace); Laura Carstens, Defining, Inspiring,
and Implementing Sustainability, NAT’L CIVIC REV., Fall 2010, at 12–15 (describing Dubuque,
Iowa’s “Sustainable Dubuque Initiative”); More than the Environment, supra note 10
(describing Omaha, Nebraska’s “‘Back to the River’ initiative,” which seeks to transform
Omaha’s riverfront into a sustainable area that includes common spaces, an office park, and a
corporate headquarters); infra Part V.A.
120. Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 17 (“[T]ens of thousands of properties
around the country would be substantially more attractive if cleanup costs were subsidized or,
in some cases, just known with greater certainty.”).
121. Schofield, supra note 113, at 1013–14.
122. D. Evan van Hook et al., The Challenge of Brownfield Clusters: Implementing a
Multi-Site Approach for Brownfield Remediation and Reuse, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 142–
43 (2003) (arguing that synergies between stakeholders are important to the success of
brownfields redevelopment and coordination between public and private financing is
encouraged). Moreover, from a private financing standpoint, when “private parties work in a
partnership with the public sector” it may also be easier to purchase insurance. Id. at 151.
123. Minkus, supra note 15, at 269, 315–16; see also Letter from Barry Trilling, Partner,
Wiggin & Dana LLP, to Peter Meyer, Dir., Ctr. for Envtl. Policy & Mgmt., Univ. of Louisville
(Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://www.cpeo.org/lists/brownfields/2006/msg00473.html
(suggesting both public and private sectors should participate in brownfields redevelopment
through publicly funded incentive programs that would encourage private developer
involvement).
124. LEVERAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2. Local circumstances are
often as important to brownfields redevelopment as environmental or cost elements.
Espinosa, supra note 12, at 30. Moreover, the idea of “public approval” of brownfields
redevelopment has already been contemplated and is encouraged for the master planning of
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Whether a PPP could aid in the ownership process is less understood,
but two less-used redevelopment tactics, explained below, make public–
private cooperation a focus throughout the remediation process.
The first is the multi-site approach.
Typically, brownfields
125
This may be
redevelopment is done on a parcel-by-parcel basis.
because states require tight regulation and encourage parcel-specific
cleanups due to the varied chemicals and waste existing at different,
126
But, redeveloping brownfields in clusters
even adjacent, properties.
could add efficiency to the process, pull in more stakeholders, and
provide greater public value if the properties were coordinated during
127
cleanup. Could states implement programs where municipalities and
private entities share in development and use grants not otherwise
available to private parties, while ensuring an ongoing, coordinated,

cities and general public awareness. Pippin, supra note 28, at 604–05. See generally Daniel S.
Wilson & Tara A. Butler, The New Market Frontier: Unlocking Community Capitalism
Through Brownfields Redevelopment, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 229–30. Thus, any
brownfields redevelopment effort by a private entity would be better accomplished by
cooperation between private developers, local authorities, and the public at large. Though
not related to public–private partnerships, those researching brownfields in Milwaukee have
suggested using public funding for “market-driven” brownfields redevelopment in locations
that will generate the greatest property tax benefit per unit of public investment. See
Christopher A. De Sousa et al., Assessing the Effect of Publicly Assisted Brownfield
Redevelopment on Surrounding Property Values, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 95, 95, 108 (2009)
(speculating that such an approach could lead to property tax increases through large and
small-scale brownfields redevelopment efforts).
125. Eisen, supra note 62, at 10285. Not only can this be tenuous for prospective
developers and communities, but it is not in line with smart-growth principles. See id.
126. For example, David Misky of the Redevelopment Authority of the City of
Milwaukee (RACM) mentions that it may be easier for the City of Milwaukee to assess, test,
and clean adjacent brownfield properties together, but because of varied environmental
issues at each site, the WDNR generally ensures that cleanup is done on a parcel-by-parcel
basis. Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra note 42. The City of Delavan,
Wisconsin, tried to test and clean on a multi-site basis, but it was unable to do so because, due
to varied environmental issues and ownership problems at each site, a multi-site approach
was not feasible under Wisconsin’s standards. See Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf,
supra note 23. Site-investigations in Wisconsin require the submission of a detailed work plan
that requires specific data for each site. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 716.09 (current through
669 Wis. Admin. Reg. (Oct., 1 2011)).
127. Van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 114; see also Sulkowski, supra note 16, at 110–11
(arguing that “holistic” approaches are best for all stakeholders because brownfields
redevelopments often fail for non-environmental reasons and local issues). Moreover, parcelby-parcel approaches lack the ability to attack the social and aesthetic problems in areas that
contain large swaths of open land because, with individual-site remediation focuses,
developers are often too fixated on the financials of an individual property rather than the
rejuvenation of an entire blighted community. Maro, supra note 80, at 173–74.

15 - BRUNNER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

330

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 11:56 AM

[95:305

cross-property focus through the life of the redeveloped parcels? 128
129
Successful brownfields redevelopment requires flexibility, so if multisite coordination can reduce cleanup costs by such measures as sharing
mobile testing labs and simultaneous land investigations, Wisconsin and
other states should consider using a multi-site approach to better
130
facilitate cleanup.
Second, northwestern European countries are experimenting with
public involvement in ways that are unique to many American
131
redevelopment attempts. According to some, the “western” model to
132
brownfields redevelopment involves public participation, but it seems
that Europe is in reality being more innovative with this concept.
Recognizing that public–private models are “creative way[s] to realize
public projects with private involvement in developing, building,
financing, maintaining and/or operating in order to add value to the
133
benefit of the whole project,” some northwestern European countries
have placed creative spins on PPPs. One such cooperative measure is
the “alliance,” where mutual operation of brownfields redevelopment
134
sites is maintained in the long-term and not just the cleanup process.
128. See van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 118.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 134–35; Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 17 (“[A]n areawide approach
could promise a high enough increase in property values to make it attractive for property
owners, prospective purchasers, and developers to invest in remediation and
redevelopment . . . .”).
131. See generally M.B. GLASER, PPP AND BROWNFIELD REVITALISATION SITES IN
NORTH-WEST EUROPE (2005), available at http://www.revitnweurope.org/selfguidingtrail/20_
PPP_and_Brownfield_Revitalisation_Sites_in_NorthWest_Europe.pdf.
132. Pippin, supra note 28, at 593.
133. GLASER, supra note 131, at 10.
134. Id. at 15; see also WORLD BANK, EUR. AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION
SUSTAINABLE DEV. DEP’T, THE MANAGEMENT OF BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: A
GUIDANCE NOTE 39 (2010) (“A PPP alliance, ideally, fosters a close cooperation between
the public and private side through all stages of the redevelopment process, including risk
sharing and financing.”). In Nantes, France, the redevelopment of contaminated land
included an alliance approach. See GLASER, supra note 131, at 15, 35 & fig.19. The City of
Nantes and private investors are sharing in the development of part of the Ile de Nantes in
the form of a PPP alliance. Id. at 35 fig.19. The PPP is owned 61% by the City of Nantes and
39% by private investors and has a life span of twenty years. Id. After completion of the
redevelopment, maintenance is shared. Id. As a whole, the public areas remain public
whereas PPP designated areas are controlled by the PPP. Id. The PPP purchases the land,
designates public spaces, and may designate land to sell; but these decisions are all made
based on the 61% to 39% public–private ownership split. See id. at 66–68. Ultimately, the
city believes that by taking on more risk in cleanup efforts it can better attract economic
development; but the city is comfortable with this because part of the PPP model involves
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Through an alliance, private entities might find brownfields projects
more feasible because they would be able to get guidance from
municipalities by way of funding otherwise available only if
municipalities owned and operated the redeveloped property. That is,
an alliance method allows private entities to take advantage of funding
mechanisms not ordinarily at their disposal.
Despite the creative methods available to remediate brownfields, the
number of contaminated properties across the country continues to rise.
In Wisconsin, the number of closed plants has increased in recent
135
The economy is likely a large factor for the increase, but the
years.
fact that these properties will sit vacant for a long time, in large part
because of their contaminated state, is startling. Relaxing brownfields
regulations and redevelopment standards could promote economic
development while still preventing environmental problems—the two
136
Standards should not only be read as
primary cleanup objectives.
“liability invoking,” but also as the rules that guide funding and
procedural mechanisms of designated ways to actually obtain assistance
to properly cleanup and put to productive use contaminated
137
properties.
What each method described above shows is that when communities
and private parties redevelop brownfields in conjunction, more options
are created. Community involvement ensures that environmental
138
justice goals are met, which is important because applicants from less

added public space and greenspace. Id. at 68. Thus far, rejuvenation efforts include the
development of civic buildings, university additions, and commercial offices. See ANDREW
GRAY, ILE DE NANTES: FESTIVAL ON INDUSTRIAL HERITAGE (2007), available at
http://www.revit-nweurope.org/selfguidingtrail/13_Ile_de_Nantes_festival_on_industrial_
heritage.pdf.
135. See Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR, Presentation at 2010
Wis. Am. Planning Conf. 14 (May 5, 2010) [hereinafter Presentation at 2010 Wis. Planning
Conf.], available at http://www.wisconsinplanners.org/attachments/presentations2010/Conque
ringBrownfieldsDNR.pdf; Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR,
Redevelopment and Reuse: Conquering Brownfields, Presentation 19 [hereinafter
Redevelopment and Reuse] (on file with author).
136. See Applegate, supra note 13, at 284–85. But see McCarthy, supra note 18, at 290
(warning us of the risks of relaxed brownfields regulatory standards by highlighting 27,200
contaminated sites that may have been “archived” without “adequate environmental site
assessments” after more leeway was given for the assessment of those sites).
137. See Applegate, supra note 13, at 284–85.
138. Lincoln L. Davies, Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of
Brownfields Redevelopment in Environmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
285, 288, 316 (1999).
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wealthy communities are often ignored. 139 Yet, partnership approaches
could alleviate risk to less experienced developers, who are reluctant to
140
dive into the brownfields market. Thus, forming a team of public and
private influence that is willing to be innovative is imperative.
IV. MUNICIPAL–PRIVATE COOPERATION TO PROMOTE
GREENSPACE DEVELOPMENT
Municipality-based brownfields redevelopment options are superior
to those for private entities because municipalities have better access to
federal and state funding awards. 141 Furthermore, municipalities incur
less liability and fewer penalties for owning contaminated property, are
exempt in more ways than private entities from incurring liability after
acquiring a contaminated property, and often incur far less cost than
142
Perhaps then, municipalities
private entities during redevelopment.
can use these advantages to aid private redevelopment efforts through a
partnership setting.
The cost of brownfields redevelopment makes the conversion
143
Brownfields grant
process contingent on help from the government.
programs that encourage and fund greenspace conversions are more
widely available to municipalities than private entities—yet, greenspace
144
In fact, among
redevelopment projects are often passed over.
remediation “success stories” highlighted by the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources (WDNR), only four projects received funding
through Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant—a program that I will describe

139. Matthew Dull & Kris Wernstedt, Land Recycling, Community Revitalization, and
Distributive Politics: An Analysis of EPA Brownfields Program Support, 38 POL’Y STUD. J.
119, 134, 136 (2010).
140. Redevelopment and Reuse, supra note 135, at 22 (“The more experienced
developers consider brownfields management as just another aspect of development. . . .
While those with less tend to react more cautiously, but are willing to do it again.” (quoting
Chris De Sousa)).
141. See, e.g., Dull & Wernstedt, supra note 139, at 134 (noting local governments are
more likely to receive brownfields redevelopment support); Telephone Interview with
Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR (Jan. 6, 2011).
142. See Minkus, supra note 15, at 301.
143. Brown & Kraft, supra note 119, at 381.
144. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 562 & n.3 (noting that brownfield-togreenspace conversions account for 5% of all brownfield redevelopment projects). This is
despite recognition by the EPA that brownfield programs should not just be created for
facilitating taxable development, but also for adding greenspace. See EPA Brownfields
Grants of $71 Million Will Help Address Petroleum and Other Hazards, supra note 26.
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thoroughly in Part V. 145
Greenspace redevelopment should not be an afterthought. Because
transforming brownfields into greenspace takes taxable land off of the
market, thus removing land that could potentially increase a
146
municipality’s tax base, brownfield-to-greenspace conversions may be
looked at as development that restricts rather than encourages
economic activity (and that would be especially difficult in today’s
147
However, for numerous reasons, the benefits of
economic climate).
mixing
greenspace
redevelopment
efforts
into
community
148
redevelopment are not only plentiful on the public health front, but
significant from an economic standpoint as well.
149
Greenspace developments can be tools for economic urban health
that provide the “positive economic impacts [of] increasing property
150
Property values
values and bringing people to local businesses.”
increase with proximity to parks, while parks can increase tourism,
151
which can expand local economies in size and scope. Further, the high
cost of financing parks is potentially offset by the sale of adjacent land

145. Remediation and Redevelopment Program Success Stories, WIS. DNR,
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/cleanup/sstories.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) [hereinafter
Remediation & Redevelopment Success Stories]. Though brownfield-to-greenspace projects
are becoming more popular, as recent as 2008, this form of redevelopment compromised less
than 5% of U.S. brownfield projects. DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 155.
146. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 565. Further, greenspace can be a fiscal
drain because municipalities and their taxpayers ultimately fund park spaces. William W.
Buzbee, Sprawl’s Political-Economy and the Case for a Metropolitan Green Space Initiative,
32 URB. LAW. 367, 386 (2000).
147. See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 293 (suggesting that any requirement concerning
future use of property could restrict profit opportunities that a community might otherwise
have available).
148. Applegate, supra note 13, at 271 (suggesting that greenspaces pose less risk to
individuals because people spend less time on greenspaces than elsewhere); Timothy Beatley,
Biophilic Urbanism: Inviting Nature Back to Our Communities and into Our Lives, 34 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 209, 212 (2009) (recognizing that greenspace added to
communities can boost individual mood, health, and performance).
149. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 96.
150. Anna Read & Isabel Fernandez, Integrated Greenspace Networks a Smart Option,
PUB. MGMT., Nov. 1, 2010, at 16, 16 (discussing how the greening of land can offer economic
benefits ranging from increased property values to business development at adjacent
locations); see also Buzbee, supra note 146, at 384 (“[S]ome of the most valuable real estate in
the country is near to substantial park spaces.”); EPA Brownfields Grants of $71 Million Will
Help Address Petroleum and Other Hazards, supra note 26. Indeed, a 2006 study found that
property values of nearby homes increased when brownfields were redeveloped as
greenspaces. Kaufman & Cloutier, supra note 33, at 27–29.
151. Read & Fernandez, supra note 150, at 17.
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or taxes realized from nearby entities. 152 Even more, developing
community greenspace could revitalize blighted neighborhoods by
enhancing street life, boosting community aesthetics, and providing
153
By generally enhancing the
additional free-recreation options.
attractiveness of communities, greenspace puts urban cores in better
154
positions to attract jobs and private investment.
Investment in the greening of urban lands is a potential economic
155
But is more public
“boon” that could be sparked by public funding.
funding for greenspace development worth it? Wisconsin’s main
brownfield-to-greenspace funding package is designed to provide no
156
In some
more than $200,000 for cleanup and site assessment.
situations, a $200,000 grant would comprise just two or three percent of
157
total development costs. However, winning a grant can generate local
158
Plus, one award
interest and knowledge of brownfields reuse issues.
159
may provide leverage toward obtaining further funding, and the ability

152. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141 (suggesting
that communities might not be aware of some benefits that developing park space provide
and, further, that communities could and should develop park space but may be taking
caution in doing so because they are having difficulty financing their present park systems).
Possibly, smaller park parcels that require minimal maintenance are better suited as
economically viable ways to grow interest in adjacent properties.
153. Dunn, supra note 72, at 48 (“Green space helps to increase property values,
revitalize blighted neighborhoods, enhance street life and community aesthetics, and provide
free recreation. Open, active green space, draws people out of their homes and with more
individuals present in the community, crime can be reduced.”).
154. See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 379. In fact, when Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant
was created, many that recommended it did so because of the benefit they believed
converting brownfields to greenspace would have on the economic outlooks of those areas.
See Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141. A greenspace initiative could
also reduce sprawl, which some argue is a way to bring jobs and economic activity back to the
urban core. Buzbee, supra note 146, at 379.
155. Dunn, supra note 72, at 60.
156. Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities Grants, WIS. DNR,
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace_grant.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
157. Dull & Wernstedt, supra note 139, at 121. But see Telephone Interview with David
Misky, supra note 42 (mentioning that a small award could go a long way toward facilitating
smaller-scale greenspace conversions).
158. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 293 (referring to how progress and successful
brownfield remediation efforts can lead to more revitalization, calling this the “domino
effect”).
159. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141; see also Telephone
Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23 (mentioning that receiving a few brownfields
redevelopment grants made it easier to obtain and implement other available funding
options, notably, a $200,000 award through Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant).
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to package funds may lead to redevelopment success. 160 Arguably, the
low dollar amount suggests that such funding would be best utilized in
161
smaller-scale developments of lower overall costs.
Municipalities are best-suited to quarterback brownfield-togreenspace conversions because of better funding options and because
162
public involvement would generate greater stakeholder input. Still, an
argument exists that any private development should be left to the
market forces without government interference. Arguably, allowing
municipalities to quarterback a brownfield-to-greenspace development
that involves private entities, and allowing those private entities to take
advantage of public funding designed for municipalities, increases
163
Although, when
government’s influence on private development.
there is no market, government—or government in conjunction with
private entities—may have a role in providing avenues to overcome
164
development deadlocks. PPPs have been proposed to combat market
failure in the research and development field as a way to alleviate risks

160. See Brown & Kraft, supra note 119, at 381 (“[B]rownfield conversions may prosper
in suitable conditions—for example, when the public sector owns the land in question, local
leaders support both the conversion itself and allocation of the converted land to greenspace,
environmental groups get mobilized, estimates of the costs of maintenance of greenspace are
not overestimated, and the federal or state government lends support.”); Dull & Wernstedt,
supra note 139, at 121.
161. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
162. See van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 114 (adding that more stakeholder
involvement may increase efficiency).
163. Any approach that allows the government to influence the competitive aspect of
private enterprise has been cautioned. See, e.g., Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic
Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1964); James S. Burling, Public Private Partnerships—A
Brave New World or a Return to Serfdom?, in EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUE
LITIGATION 563, 565 (ALI-ABA, Course of Study, 2009) (“And those who self-identify as
libertarians would prefer as much absence of government as possible from the design and
revitalization of American cities, thinking that government interference will at best merely
delay inevitable economic forces.”).
164. See Gerry Stoker, Public–Private Partnerships and Urban Governance, in
PARTNERSHIPS IN URBAN GOVERNANCE: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 34,
34–35 (Jon Pierre ed., 1997) (“[Governance’s] focus is on the interdependence of
governmental and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges.
Governance is about governmental and non-governmental organizations working together.
Its concern is with how the challenge of collective action is met and the issues and tensions
associated with this shift in the pattern of governing.”); Graeme Hodge & Carsten Greve,
Theorizing Public–Private Partnership Success: A Market-Based Alternative to Government?
17–20
(Syracuse
Univ.,
Pub.
Mgmt.
Res.
Conf.,
2011),
available
at,
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/PMRC_Hodge_and_Grev
e_2011.pdf.
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associated with investing in certain technologies. 165 Likewise, because
brownfields have created development roadblocks, PPPs may have a
proper place in brownfields redevelopment, providing assistance in
some areas, such as information, funding, and clarification—thereby
166
addressing financial and uncertainty problems faced by developers.
The next Part discusses the recent measures taken by Wisconsin to
promote efficient brownfields redevelopment—namely, the Wisconsin
Plant Recovery Initiative (WPRI). I will then highlight Wisconsin’s
existing-but-faltering brownfield-to-greenspace grant and two “success
stories” of that grant’s application.
V. WPRI AND THE WISCONSIN GREEN SPACE GRANT
A. Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative
Wisconsin was hit hard in the 2000s by manufacturers leaving its
urban centers for the outskirts of its own cities and cities of other
167
Not surprisingly, given the state’s industrial heritage and
states.
progressive environmental focus, Wisconsin has been fairly active on the
168
It adopted numerous reforms
brownfields redevelopment front.
through its 1994 Land Recycling Act, such as cleanup requirements and
169
liability exemptions upon acquiring tax-delinquent property.

165. Albert N. Link & John T. Scott, Public/Private Partnerships: Stimulating
Competition in a Dynamic Market, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 763, 766–75 (2001). Link and
Scott defined “market failure” as “a condition under which the market, including both the
R&D-investing producers of a technology and the users of the technology, underinvests from
society’s standpoint in a particular technology.” Id. at 767. They suggested fixing
underinvestments in the R&D field, in part, by mixing “partial public funding [with]
privately-performed research.” Id. at 764.
166. Mugdan, supra note 25, at 1676 (highlighting that government can provide
information, money, and clarification or liquidation of liability). Information might include
how the site was previously used, what cleanup has been attempted, or what programs are
available to plant seed money. Id. at 1776–77. Money could include Superfund dollars or
direct and indirect federal grants. Id. at 1678–80. Clarification or liquidation of liability
would include liability relief. Id. at 1681, 1684. The government’s purpose might be as simple
as “managing time-related costs and attenuating developer frustration.” DE SOUSA, supra
note 5, at 115.
167. Presentation at 2010 Wis. Planning Conf., supra note 135, at 3.
168. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14 (“[Wisconsin] offers not only an
extensive track record of redeveloping different types of brownfield sites but also a wide
range of program incentives and tools to promote contaminated site cleanup and encourage
public and private parties to talk about the program.”).
169. See id. at 15. Voluntary parties, lenders, and fiduciaries that take title to taxdelinquent sites are also exempt from cleanup liability. Harrington, supra note 20, at 985.
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Wisconsin also received a disproportionately large number of EPA
brownfields grant awards between 2003 and 2007 when compared to
170
other states. And Milwaukee, its largest city and industrial center, is
171
regarded as having a leading brownfields redevelopment program. As
an example, Milwaukee’s Menomonee River Valley, previously a swath
of vacant, contaminated lots, has been restored to the industrial mecca
that it once was because new facilities and outside investors have
flooded the area in response to a community-wide cleanup and reuse
172
plan.
173
and
Still, the economic downturn created new brownfields,
174
From 2007 to
currently there are an estimated 8000 in Wisconsin.
2009 the number of yearly plant closings increased by seventy-five
175
percent, while some estimate that from 2008 to 2009 the raw number
176
of closed plants existing in Wisconsin increased by over one hundred.
The recent plant closures—which include two major automobile
177
plants —have frustrated Wisconsin’s economy, which has suffered
178
approximately 170,000 job losses since 2008.
Wisconsin’s Land Recycling Act encourages the use of TIF districts as well. Id. at 986. See
generally 1993 Wis. Act 453.
170. Dull & Wernstedt, supra note 139, at 123 fig.2.
171. Hunt, supra note 31, at 12.
172. See, e.g., Eric Decker, Made in Milwaukee: Pizza from the Valley, MILWAUKEE
BIZTIMES, (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.biztimes.com/news/2011/1/7/made-in-milwaukee-pizzafrom-the-valley (recognizing that the Menomonee Valley has been Milwaukee’s industrial
center for more than 100 years); William D’Urso, A Sweet Move: Suzy’s Plans Expansion in
Valley, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 2011, at 1D; E-mail from David Misky, Assistant
Executive Dir.—Sec’y, Redev. Auth. of the City of Milwaukee, to author (May 31, 2011, 10:30
CST) (highlighting that a brownfield-to-greenspace conversion was instrumental in attracting
seven firms to the Valley) (on file with author). See generally LOCKWOOD GREENE
CONSULTING ET AL., MARKET STUDY, ENGINEERING, AND LAND USE PLAN FOR THE
MENOMONEE VALLEY (1998); DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 249–62.
173. Presentation at 2010 Wis. Planning Conf., supra note 135, at 10.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id. at 15.
176. Redevelopment and Reuse, supra note 135, at 19.
177. Thomas Content, Chrysler Won’t Keep Kenosha Engine Plant, JSONLINE (May 1,
2009), http://www.jsonline.com/business/44162607.html (highlighting that a Chrysler engine
plant in Kenosha, Wisconsin, will close, resulting in approximately 800 job losses);
WisBusiness: Janesville Deals with Fallout from GM Plant Closure, WISBUSINESS.COM
(June 4, 2008), http://wisbusiness.com/index.Iml?Article=127877 (highlighting the closure of a
longstanding GM facility in Janesville, Wisconsin, that will result in the loss of over 2000
jobs).
178. John Schmid, State Reports a Gain of 12,900 Private-Sector Jobs, JSONLINE (July
21, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/business/125961833.html (noting that approximately
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The pattern of plant closures triggered the WDNR to form the
179
Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative (WPRI) in March 2010. WPRI—
which targets non-NPL properties—is designed to address
environmental issues during plant closings, reach out to local
governments and private businesses, and, ultimately, expedite the
cleanup and reuse process of Wisconsin’s closed plants by providing
180
financial assistance and regulatory guidance.
By “speed[ing] up the clean-up and revitalization of plants,” WPRI
181
Under the
should help municipalities attract private enterprise.
182
initiative, $1 million in WDNR assessment monies are available, with
171,000 jobs were lost during the 2008–2009 recession); 2010 Wisconsin Plant Recovery
Initiative (WPRI) and WPRI Assessment Monies Webinar, Presentation 2 (Mar. 23, 2010)
[hereinafter WPRI Webinar], available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/training/wpri_wam.pdf.
Over 40% of the lost jobs were in the manufacturing sector. Id. During the drafting of this
Comment, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker took office under a promise to drastically
increase private-sector jobs. Summer 2011 estimates suggest that Wisconsin’s steady decline
of manufacturing jobs is turning around. See Schmid, supra; Press Release, Wis. Dep’t
Workforce Dev., May Jobs, Unemployment Numbers Announced for State (June 16, 2011),
available at http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dwd/newsreleases/2011/unemployment/110616_june_
state.pdf (highlighting the addition of 13,100 manufacturing jobs between January and May,
2011). This footnote is meant solely to acknowledge that Wisconsin’s manufacturing sector
may be finding a way to reverse the downward spiral it was in for much of the past decade.
Surely, there are other, better ways to increase jobs than simply to cleanup brownfields;
however, these statistics should not diminish any understanding that the many closed plants in
Wisconsin increased its brownfields problem, nor diminish the fact that Wisconsin’s job losses
before Governor Walker took office were far greater than the estimated 50,000 to have been
created since then. See Schmid, supra.
179. See, e.g., WPRI Webinar, supra note 178, at 2; George Marek & Alexander Gore,
Wisconsin DNR Launches Industrial and Commercial Facilities Recovery Initiative: Benefits
for Wisconsin Municipalities, PUB. FIN. L. UPDATE (Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee,
Wis.), Mar. 2010, available at http://www.quarles.com/files/Publication/c9bd9bf8-1e99-47dd9ec2-5f05cfab5fd3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/13c90d72-1f30-43fb-b64912321c3215d
d/Wisconsin%20DNR%20Update.pdf; Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra note
42.
180. Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative, WIS. DNR, http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/
rbrownfields/wpri.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
181. Marek & Gore, supra note 179; see also WIS. DNR, WISCONSIN DNR PLANT
RECOVERY INITIATIVE (2010), available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/
RR862.pdf (noting that the initiative assists both businesses and communities in prompt
clean-up).
182. George Marek & Alexander Gore, Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative: Grant and
Technical Services Opportunities Expand as Program Matures, PUB. FIN. L. UPDATE (Quarles
& Brady LLP, Milwaukee, Wis.), Oct.
2010, available at http://www.quarles.com/
wisconsin_plant_recovery_initiative_oct_2010/ (“[A] total of $1 million is available to local
governments and other eligible applicants to hire environmental consultants to investigate
environmental contamination, including Phase I and/or Phase II site assessments, NR 716 site
investigations and underground storage tank . . . removals.”).
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$200,000 allowed per project. 183 For a property to be eligible for
funding, a municipality does not need to own the parcel but must have
184
The “top goal” is “to assess environmentally
access to it.
contaminated sites where important community jobs have been lost—
with the hope of attracting new manufacturing plants or other
185
businesses.”
B. The Wisconsin Green Space Grant
WPRI evidences Wisconsin’s continued push for creative ways to
solve its brownfields problem. I question, then, the failed maintenance
of one creative program, which implements greenspace and has
previously helped Wisconsin communities revitalize contaminated
properties in blighted areas.
Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant helped twenty-one projects acquire
186
funding in the past decade. At its inception, the Green Space Grant
187
This grant focuses on helping local
was one of the first of its kind.
188
It is
governments redevelop brownfields for long-term public use.
189
available only to public entities, but non-profit organizations are

183. Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative Assessment Monies (WAM), WIS. DNR,
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/financial/wam/index.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
184. Id.
185. WPRI Webinar, supra note 178, at 47. Further goals include increasing the number
of communities that clean up contaminated properties, encouraging community and public
awareness, and leveraging public resources. Id. at 6–7.
186. DNR GREEN SPACE & PUBLIC FACILITIES GRANTS: ROUND ONE GRANT
AWARDS,
2004
[hereinafter
DNR
ROUND
ONE],
available
at
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/round1.pdf (highlighting that round one
provided eleven total awards); DNR GREEN SPACE & PUBLIC FACILITIES GRANTS: ROUND
TWO GRANT AWARDS, 2006 [hereinafter DNR ROUND TWO], available at
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/round2.pdf (round two provided eight
awards); DNR GREEN SPACE & PUBLIC FACILITIES GRANTS: ROUND THREE GRANT
AWARDS,
2008–2009
[hereinafter
DNR
ROUND
THREE],
available
at
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/round3.pdf (round three provided two
awards).
187. Press Release, Wis. DNR, Hassett Announces New DNR Grants to Help Clean Up
Brownfields for Public Use (Apr. 13, 2004), available at http://www.wnrmag.com/org/
aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/gs-04-04.pdf.
188. Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities Grants, supra note 156.
189. For example, “[e]ligible applicants include tribes, cities, villages, towns, counties,
redevelopment authorities, community development authorities and housing authorities.” Id.
Recipients must match up to 50% of the award amount, depending on the size of the grant.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.15(1)(a)–(c) (current through 669 Wis. Admin. Reg. (Oct. 1,
2011)).
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allowed to partner-up with participating municipalities. 190
Upon
receiving funding and redeveloping a plot into greenspace or public
facilities, the municipality must hold the property to that public use for
191
at least twenty years.
The Green Space Grant previously had available $1 million in grant
192
Presently though, the
money during 2001–2003 and 2005–2007.
193
With previous awards of up to
program has no available funds.
194
$200,000 for site assessment and cleanup, this grant program could be
helpful to municipalities looking to incorporate greenspace as a part of
redevelopment efforts—particularly for smaller-scale infill projects with
lower total cleanup costs.
Below I highlight two examples of how the Green Space Grant and
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions improved the environmental
health and economic viability of blighted areas in two Wisconsin cities.
C. Successful Green Space Grant Application in Oshkosh and Delavan,
Wisconsin
The Wisconsin cities of Oshkosh

195

and Delavan 196 each received

190. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR §§ 173.15(2), .17(1)(a) (current through 669 Wis.
Admin. Reg. (Oct. 1, 2011)).
191. Id. §§ 173.05, .17(1)(b).
192. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 568.
193. The 2011–2013 Wisconsin biennial budget does not fund the Grant. See E-mail
from Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR, to author (June 20, 2011
02:44 CST) (on file with author); Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities Grants, supra
note 156. See generally 2011 Wis. Act 32.
194. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.15.
195. The City of Oshkosh has approximately 64,000 residents. Oshkosh (city),
Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/5560500.html
(last visited Oct. 16, 2011). It is located in the middle of Wisconsin’s Fox River Valley, the
state’s third largest metropolitan area, and once prospered with a strong lumber industry.
Historical
Summary
of
the
City
of
Oshkosh,
CITY
OF
OSHKOSH,
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/landmarks_commission/City_History.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2011). Its present fame rests, generally, on two things: the Oshkosh B’Gosh children’s
clothing company (which originated in the city) and the annual Experimental Aircraft
Association convention (which draws over 750,000 visitors to the city each year). CITY OF
OSHKOSH, COMMUNITY RELATIONS PLAN, U.S. EPA BROWNFIELD CLEANUP GRANT 3,
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Community_Development/Planning_Services/assets/pdf/brownfie
ld_grants/Community_Relations_Plan_Parcel%20H_Redevelopment%20_2_.pdf (last visited
Oct. 16, 2011).
196. The City of Delavan, located approximately one hour southwest of Milwaukee,
maintains nearly 8000 residents according to 2000 census estimates and has a surrounding
town of about 4500. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DELAVAN CITY, WISCONSIN 1 (2000), available
at http://censtats.census.gov/data/WI/1605519450.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DELAVAN
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$200,000 in 2004 as part of the first round of awards administered by the
197
Each city’s project—funded in part by this
Green Space Grant.
198
grant—is a documented success story by the WDNR.
1. Oshkosh—Riverside Park & Leach Amphitheater
Oshkosh’s Riverside Park is located where downtown Oshkosh
199
In 2002, debris, contaminated soil, and
meets the Fox River.
underground gas holders were removed from the riverside location that
200
The city purchased the
once housed a manufactured gas plant.
property in 2003, and, with a $200,000 Green Space Grant award and
other funding, the community developed a recreational space, which
201
The
includes a riverwalk and a music venue (Leach Amphitheater).
202
project’s success has led to continued development efforts.
The Leach Amphitheater, which opened in 2005, is an outdoor
riverfront music venue that can accommodate up to 7500 visitors per
203
The venue, which is operated by the Oshkosh Parks
event.
204
has sparked Oshkosh’s entertainment scene and
Department,
continues to generate revenue for the city through events: notably, three
festivals, Waterfest, Irishfest, and Oktoberfest, use the facility (the latter

TOWN,
WALWORTH
COUNTY,
WISCONSIN
1
(2000),
available
at
http://censtats.census.gov/data/WI/0605512719475.pdf. Delavan’s industrial history dates
back to the mid-1800s; currently, it sits on a freight-rail corridor and Interstate Highway 43.
History of Delavan, Wisconsin, CITY OF DELAVAN, http://ci.delavan.wi.us/history.cfm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2011).
197. See DNR ROUND ONE, supra note 186.
198. Remediation & Redevelopment Success Stories, supra note 145.
199. See CITY OF OSHKOSH, DOWNTOWN ACTION PLAN 18–19 (2000), available at
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Community_Development/Planning_Services/downtown_action_
plan.asp.
200. Riverside Park/Leach Amphitheater, REMEDIATION & REDEV. PROGRAM (Wis.
DNR, Madison, Wis.), Nov. 2007, available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs
/RR777.pdf.
201. Id. The city’s plans to expand the park date back to the early 1990s. E-mail from
Darryn Burich, Planning Dir., City of Oshkosh, to author (Jan. 13, 2011, 10:26:00 CST) (on
file with author).
202. See A. NELESSEN ASSOCS., VISION REPORT: CITY OF OSHKOSH 54 (2009)
(highlighting that Leach Amphitheater has been a success and contemplating other
entertainment avenues that would further redevelopment efforts).
203. LEACH AMPHITHEATER, http://www.leachamphitheater.com/index.asp (last visited
Nov. 3, 2011).
204. Parks Department, CITY OF OSHKOSH, http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Parks/ (last
visited Nov. 3, 2011).
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two being non-existent before the Leach’s creation). 205
Waterfest is an Oshkosh institution and was a music destination for
the area long before the Leach was developed; however, the Leach has
enhanced its success. The weekly summer festival series used to have
free admission, but with the increase in attendance and the attraction of
more popular music acts, it now charges up to $20 for individual
admission on a given night with season passes available that are worth
206
The city estimates that Waterfest has entertained 60,000 to
$200.
207
70,000 guests annually since it moved to the Leach.
Lost among Oshkosh’s entertainment upgrades can be how it got
there. Recall that before the Leach Amphitheater became a reality, that
208
A little
portion of Riverside Park was simply a brownfield.
greenspace, a portion of a riverwalk, and one band-shell created a boost
in visitors and future development prospects for a mid-sized city.
The present city planner insists that the $200,000 Green Space Grant
“very effectively” guided the project forward by helping pay for cleanup
209
Without it, the city would have had to scramble for other
costs.
funding—funding that Oshkosh is currently having trouble finding to
210
complete the riverwalk that begins at Riverside Park.
The Riverside Park expansion demonstrates the potential benefits of
incorporating greenspaces and park-based public facilities into
brownfields remediation efforts, and how important a mere $200,000
can be to moving a project forward. Quite possibly, if Green Space
Grant funding was available, such funding could give an extra boost to
the currently stalled Oshkosh riverwalk expansion—an expansion that is
integral to a Downtown Plan expected to result in nearly 200 created

205. See Erin Crowley, Top Eleven Events to See in 2011, THENORTHWESTERN.COM
(Dec. 30, 2010) (on file with the Oshkosh Public Library) (mentioning that 2010 will be the
third year for Irishfest and second year for Oktoberfest); OSHKOSH IRISH FEST,
http://www.oshkoshirishfest.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); Admission, OSHKOSH
OKTOBERFEST, http://www.oshkoshoktoberfest.com/admission.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2011).
206. About Waterfest, WATERFEST.ORG, http://www.waterfest.org/about.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2011). For acts that have previously performed at Waterfest, see Waterfest
Distinguished Alumni, WATERFEST.ORG, http://waterfest.org/alumni.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2011).
207. About Waterfest, supra note 206.
208. See Riverside Park/Leach Amphitheater, supra note 200.
209. E-mail from Darryn Burich, supra note 201.
210. Id.
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jobs and $800,000 in property tax value increases. 211
2. Delavan—Borg Instruments Greenspace and Retention Area
Delavan developed a greenspace and storm-water retention area
(Borg greenspace) with a $200,000 Green Space Grant that it received in
212
The Borg greenspace is part of the larger Ann Street Rail
2004.
Corridor brownfields project that is ongoing and part of a community
213
The Borg greenspace sits on the
plan to revamp a blighted area.
former site of Borg Instruments, a local timing device and clock
214
This
brownfield-to-greenspace
conversion
manufacturer.
demonstrates potential success, as opposed to the actual success of
Oshkosh’s amphitheater.
Overall, the Ann Street Rail Corridor Project received $329,170 in
total brownfield WDNR Site Assessment Grants and $200,000 through
215
the Green Space Grant program. The project also received $625,000
from the Wisconsin Department of Commerce for “blight
216
elimination,” while the City of Delavan received over $2 million in
217
general funds from the EPA.
Delavan residents indicated in a survey that the Ann Street Corridor
was especially “unpleasant or unattractive,” so it was important for
218
Presently,
Delavan to alter the perception of that area of town.

211. CITY OF OSHKOSH, APPLICATION FOR EPA COMMUNITY-WIDE BROWNFIELDS
ASSESSMENT GRANTS: HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES AND PETROLEUM 18 (2010), available at
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Community_Development/Planning_Services/assets/pdf/EPA_A
ssessment_Grant_Petro_Haz_10_1.pdf.
212. Delavan Borg Instruments, REMEDIATION & REDEV. PROGRAM (Wis. DNR,
Madison, Wis.), Jan. 2009, available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/RR815.pdf.
213. Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23. The city wanted to
redevelop the former Borg site to reduce crime and safety threats in that neighborhood.
Delavan Redevelopment Authority, WI, BROWNFIELDS 2004 REVOLVING LOAN FUND
GRANT FACT SHEET (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), June 2004, available at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/bf_factsheets/gfs/index.cfm?event=factsheet.display&display_type=PDF
&xpg_id=3665. The redevelopment was also designed to attract commercial development
and increase new jobs, in addition to simply adding greenspace. Id.
214. Delavan Borg Instruments, supra note 212.
215. AYRES ASSOCS., FINDING FUNDING FOR YOUR PROJECTS 3 (2009), available at
http://www.ayresassociates.com/images/services/general_civil/grant%20brochure%20pdf%20
version%202%202009.pdf.
216. Id. at 2.
217. Id. at 6.
218. VANDEWALLE & ASSOCS., CITY OF DELAVAN, WISCONSIN, COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN 14–15 (Common Council Adoption, Nov. 10, 2009).
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Delavan wishes to relocate its fire station to the Borg greenspace area,
as well as change that area’s industrial zone to light manufacturing,
219
commercial, and medium-density housing. These changes could shift
the blighted condition of the Ann Street Rail Corridor to make it a
more appealing neighborhood.
Though there has been some development interest around the
220
As it stands, a new carproperty, a poor economy halted progress.
wash is the only commercial development to spring up adjacent to the
221
however, the car-wash
property containing the greenspace;
development needed funding support for environmental cleanup from
222
We will have to wait for a
the community and State of Wisconsin.
better economy to truly see what kind of development could prosper
223
near the Borg greenspace.
The Delavan Director of Public Works, who oversees the Ann Street
project, insists that the $200,000 was very helpful to moving the project
224
In an interview, he was adamant that the Borg site
forward.
significantly cleaned up a blighted area and made the surrounding
properties better suited for residential development—which he said the
City wants to include in that area’s plan through some form of
225
apartment housing. He mentioned that the City planned the retention
226
area before realizing that the Green Space Grant existed. But, upon
applying for the Green Space Grant and receiving the award, the project
came to fruition much quicker than it would have had the City not
227
obtained an extra $200,000 in funding.

219. Id. at 66, 85.
220. Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23.
221. Id.
222. Id. According to Mark Wendorf, Delavan’s Director of Public Works, the car wash
needed public and state support primarily because its bank refused to provide funding unless
other avenues provided cleanup assistance. Id. However, Mr. Wendorf could not say
whether the Borg greenspace had anything to do with the car wash developing where it did.
Id.
223. See id. (during which the interviewee insisted that the unfortunate dawn of a
recession has restricted the city’s ability to attract development more quickly). Mr. Wendorf
mentioned that developers were interested in 2003 and 2004, but that by the time the Ann
Street cleanup neared completion the economy began to suffer and prospective developers
became disinterested. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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The Delavan project was not as instantly and substantially successful
as the Oshkosh amphitheater, but it has potential: the Green Space
Grant helped Delavan realize what should be done with a blighted
property and helped it realize how to incorporate the Borg parcel into
228
Moreover, the
the overall plans of the Ann Street Corridor.
interviewee said that Delavan will look to the Green Space Grant if
there are plans to develop public spaces in the future because the
229
$200,000 award was helpful in terms of funding and efficiency.
D. Maintaining the Green Space Grant
The Oshkosh and Delavan cases demonstrate how powerful
greenspace or park space oriented projects can be to facilitating
community-wide brownfields redevelopment efforts. Each project made
blighted areas of two Wisconsin cities more marketable and improved
the quality of life (even if the Delavan project’s full impact is yet to be
seen).
Unfortunately, not all Green Space Grant awards have resulted in
such glowing outcomes. For example, a condominium and lakefront
project in Racine, Wisconsin, that had a market value of roughly $200
230
The money Racine won
million, was put to rest two years ago.
through the Green Space Grant—which the city was going to use to
231
develop public space near the condos—was returned by the city. Due
to the large size of the Racine project, its failure suggests that the Green
Space Grant award had very little to do with it actually moving forward.
This suggests that a Green Space Grant award has less impact in
furthering larger-scale brownfield projects than smaller projects like the
Delavan and Oshkosh examples.
Still, in some circumstances, $200,000 can go a long way. The
Oshkosh and Delavan projects suggest that creative funding provisions
directed at brownfield-to-greenspace conversions may result in quality
of life and economic gains that are well worth the marginal WDNR
spending that might be required to push forward smaller projects.

228. See id.
229. Id.
230. Michael Burke, The Point Blues: Lakefront Development Plan Collapses, J. TIMES
(Racine, Wis.), Jan. 12, 2008, at 1A; Tom Daykin, Racine Lakefront Project Canceled,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 2008, at 2D.
231. City Returned West Racine Grant to Preserve Development Options, RACINE POST
(June 9, 2010), http://news.racinepost.com/2010/06/city-returned-west-racine-grant-to.html.
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VI. A GREEN SPACE GRANT WITH A PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
OPTION
The Delavan and Oshkosh examples demonstrate why greater
priority should be placed on implementing greenspace redevelopment
incentives into brownfields programs. States should build off of
programs like the Green Space Grant, not strip away the future use of
those grants. Funding for the Green Space Grant may have halted
232
So, because
because it was a less attractive option on its face.
developments related to the Grant’s use have shown economic progress,
making the Grant more attractive could increase awareness; and this
could be done by loosening the private-use restrictions (such as the
233
Increased
twenty-year deed restriction that the Grant imposes).
234
flexibility may lead to better funding prospects, so relaxing some of
the arguably-strict conditions and eligibility rules of the Green Space
235
Grant may be appropriate—though this would have to be done with
236
the definition of “public use” in mind.
After phase I and II cleanup occurs in conjunction with Green Space
Grant awards, one condition is that “[t]he end use will have a long-term
public benefit, including preservation of green space, development of
237
This seems fair
recreational areas or use by a local government.”
because creating a public benefit was a founding reason for this Grant’s
238
But, to be reimbursed, a municipality must agree to
existence.
239
maintain that end use and own the property for at least twenty years.
This ownership and use restriction prevents private entities from
reaping cleanup assistance and benefits because private entities, even if
developing greenspace themselves, do not have access to this Grant. In

232. See Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141.
233. Loosening the restrictions responds to the call of some proponents of brownfields
regulatory reform who insist on greater flexibility and innovation. See, e.g., Wernstedt &
Hersh, supra note 13, at 16.
234. See id. at 51, 57–58.
235. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.05(1) (current through 669 Wis. Admin. Reg.
(Oct. 1, 2011)).
236. Moreover, to make alterations, all statutory provisions guiding NR Chapter 173
may need to be altered because any administrative authority expressed by the WDNR must
adhere to the statutory provisions that govern that agency’s actions. See Wis. Builders Assoc.
v. Wis. Dep’t Trans., 2005 WI App 160, ¶ 9, 285 Wis. 2d 472, 702 N.W.2d 433.
237. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.05(2)(a).
238. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141 (mentioning that creating
a “public benefit” is one of the grant’s purposes).
239. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.17(1)(b).
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this way, the twenty-year clause restricts municipalities from attracting
240
Moreover, municipalities
economic development in creative ways.
may shy away from its use because it restricts their ability to alter the
property’s function for twenty years—in fact, one reason the City of
Racine returned its award was because it discovered the deed
241
restriction.
Arguably, allowing private entities to take ownership of and utilize
the newly cleaned up land is “having a long-term public benefit”
because private development could spur job creation or taxable
242
This conception of public benefit is similar to public
contributions.
benefit as defined in the eminent domain context, where plans to
revitalize economic areas through economic development have met the
243
For
public use requirement of the U.S. and state constitutions.
another comparison, a “public improvement,” as it relates to subdivision
development in Wisconsin, is something that “improves the value or
244
utility of the subdivision and is made available for use by the public.”
Added economic development improves the value to the public at large
because it brings in jobs and tax revenue, so it is not such a far stretch to
consider private uses of land to be public benefits in the brownfields
240. See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 293 (arguing that government requirements
concerning the future use of a redeveloped plot of land can restrict opportunities for
communities to profit off of that land).
241. City Returned West Racine Grant to Preserve Development Options, supra note 231.
242. See discussion supra Part II.B.
243. The Court in Kelo v. City of New London held that a city’s plan to acquire
properties through eminent domain and dispose of them to private developers “to revitalize
an economically distressed city,” was in line with the “public use” requirement of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 545 U.S. 469, 472, 485, 489 (2005). States may impose
stricter “public use” requirements than this, and “public benefit” in the context of chapter 173
of Wisconsin’s Natural Resources Code may have a different meaning than “public use” in
the context of the Takings Clause, but Kelo nevertheless suggests that stimulating an area’s
economy may logically be thought of as a “public benefit.” See id. at 189. Some argue that
“the power of eminent domain is needed . . . where recalcitrant slumlords or commercial
property owners are sitting on brownfields or underutilized properties that are hurting a
community.”
Robert S. Goldsmith & Robert Beckelman, What Will Happen to
Redevelopment in New Jersey When the Economy Recovers?, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 314, 327
(2009). In New Jersey, the redevelopment of blighted properties falls under the public
purpose requirement of eminent domain, consistent with New Jersey’s constitution. See N.J.
CONST. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (“The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of
blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private property may be
taken or acquired.”); Goldsmith & Beckelman, supra, at 317.
244. Rogers Dev., Inc. v. Rock Cnty. Planning & Dev. Comm., 2003 WI App 13, ¶ 13,
265 Wis. 2d 214, 666 N.W.2d 504 (defining public improvement and, moreover, holding that
the term “public improvement” should not be narrowly construed).
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redevelopment framework. 245 Moreover, the public at large has access
to many private developments, particularly retail establishments and
246
Thus, if “access” was
developments that maintain park spaces.
regarded as a “public benefit,” then even more private developments
could satisfy that overall goal.
247
Greater institutional controls for how a municipality or private
investor can redevelop a brownfield may hinder economic development
in areas tarnished by vacant lots and unappealing job prospects. The
twenty-year deed restriction in chapter 173, as is, is an unnecessary
control that could hinder economic activity because, for twenty years,
municipalities using the Green Space Grant cannot sell the greened land
or allow private entities to control it. Considering the economy and
Wisconsin’s job situation, these restrictions should contemplate cities
possibly wanting to sell already cleaned land for much-needed private
development. Also, the restrictions should contemplate that private
entities might be interested in a location if they had rights to the use of
adjacent greened land. If one of the goals of allowing the grant is to
promote greenspace, whether the greenspace is controlled publicly or
privately should not matter—a PPP model is a step toward ensuring
community involvement alongside private investment.
A. A Public–Private Partnership that Encourages Broad-Based
Community Support
PPPs ensure that communities are involved—and when communities
are involved, brownfields redevelopment is more likely to meet
248
Moreover, if the Green
environmental justice goals or standards.

245. Unfortunately, there is no case in Wisconsin that describes what “public benefit”
means in the context of chapter 173.
246. The definition of “public” in Wisconsin, adopted from Black’s Law Dictionary, is
“[o]pen or available for all to use, share, or enjoy.” Rogers Dev., 2003 WI App 13, ¶ 13, 265
Wis. 2d 214, 666 N.W.2d 504 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (7th ed. 1999)).
247. “Institutional controls” may be defined as “‘legal or physical restrictions or
limitations on the use of, or access to, a site or facility . . . to prevent activities that could
interfere with the effectiveness of a response action.’” Amy L. Edwards, Institutional
Controls, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 192, 193 (defining activity and use limitation and
identifying that “institutional controls are a type of [a]ctivity and [u]se [l]imitation” (quoting
ASTM International, Standard Guide for the Use of Activity and Use Limitations, 11 ANNUAL
BOOK OF ASTM STANDARDS 1282, 1283 (2000))). A deed restriction is a type of
institutional control. Id. at 196.
248. Davies, supra note 138, at 288, 316. Sustainable development is also better
facilitated through public–private partnerships. Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 57, at 519.
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Space Grant allowed for such partnerships for ownership purposes, then
communities might be even more interested than they presently are
because the grant would maintain flexibility in the long run for
communities using the Grant to do with the property what is best
without handcuffing those using it from, essentially, ever changing the
property’s nature.
A PPP that encourages the swapping of land and its designated
249
The New Jersey Brownfield
purposes is not unforeseen in practice.
Development Area program (BDA program) attempts to develop
blighted areas in clusters under the watch of community steering
250
committees and case managers. Through the BDA program, private
developers and contractors have access to a more diverse array of
funding sources and will receive preliminary environmental assessments;
all the while, the public steering committee and other community
251
stakeholders are involved in directing a large-scale remediation effort.
In similar form, Sheboygan, Wisconsin’s South Pier and Blue Harbor
Resort brownfields project is an example of an indirect PPP: the project
was not officially designed as a PPP, but the results are similar. The

249. In Elizabeth, New Jersey, a publicly held property “destined for park development”
was next to a marina resting in a location primed for commercial activity. Van Hook et al.,
supra note 122, at 151. The “Elizabethport Brownfield Development Area” worked on
swapping the public land for land held by private developers so they could develop on the
potential park space, which was ready to use and better suited for economic activity. See id.
The end result of the Elizabethport brownfields project was a massive mixed-use commercial
and residential development that is estimated to include over 6000 created jobs. N.J. REDEV.
AUTH., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT: CREATIVE COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS 12, available at
http://www.njra.us/njra/lib/njra/njra_2005_annual_report.pdf; see also BDA Sites at a Glance,
N.J. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT. (Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/sites/
(providing specific results from the Elizabethport brownfields project, including commercial
and residential end use). It is unclear how much the contemplated land swap had to do with
the final project, but, at the very least, the fact that such innovative measures were strongly
considered in a successful brownfields redevelopment project is thought provoking.
250. Maro, supra note 80, at 174–75. The goal of the BDA program is to “design,
coordinate and implement remediation and reuse plans affecting multiple sites in close
proximity.” David B. Farer, Brownfields Redevelopment Initiatives: Federal and Selected State
Developments, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: BROWNFIELDS AND BEYOND 1055, 1151–52 (ALI-ABA, Course of
Study, 2010).
251. Maro, supra note 80, at 176 (citing van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 124–25)
(noting that steering committees design and implement informal plans and that the state
“make[s] sure assessments are completed”). Because of the collective approach, resources
and grants from multiple organizations become available to BDA program developments. Id.
With all community stakeholders involved, “a for-profit site proposal [could] coincide with
the addition of a green space or community-desired site.” Id. at 178–79.
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Sheboygan project used extensive public funding—including over $3
million in WDNR land recycling and commerce grants—which resulted
in part public (beach access, boardwalk, eco-park) and part private
252
(resort, restaurant) property. Ultimately, redeveloping brownfields in
clusters that involve public and private entities in cooperation could add
efficiency to the process, pull in more stakeholders, and provide greater
253
public value.
If a land-sharing model through the Green Space Grant ever moves
forward, then public approval of such development will likely gain
importance. The idea of public approval in brownfields redevelopment
254
has already been contemplated. A similar approach would be to have
private entities and municipalities partnering to maintain “public
255
relations” teams to form consensus among all stakeholders. It is also
wise for city planning to involve local residents and the general public
because, while public brownfields promotion could spark political action
256
and public approval for redevelopment, a lack of communication
257
could discourage community support.
The “EPA’s Brownfields Program empowers states, communities,
and other stakeholders to work together to prevent, assess, safely clean
258
In light of the present
up, and sustainably reuse brownfields.”

252. 2006 Phoenix Award Community Impact Winner: Sheboygan Harbor Center,
REMEDIATION & REDEV. PROGRAM (Wis. DNR, Madison, Wis.), July 2006, available at
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/RR759.pdf; see also Redevelopment and Reuse,
supra note 135, at 45–54 (providing the South Pier’s mixed-use plan details and financing
breakdown).
253. Van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 114.
254. Pippin, supra note 28, at 604–05; see also Davies, supra note 138, at 298
(highlighting that in Michigan some grants require “local support” for a project).
255. See generally Howard C. Landau, Building Consensus for the Project, in
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 149, 149–54. Others have suggested “public dialogues,”
where community residents can voice concerns about a project, and “working groups,” where
a smaller number of community leaders sit down with redevelopment officials and strategize
community remediation efforts. Chambers, supra note 7, at 250–51.
256. Robertson, supra note 33, at 1090.
257. See, e.g., Janice Christensen, Garden Park: A Catalytic Project, RIVERWEST
CURRENTS (May 3, 2009), http://www.riverwestcurrents.org/20090503169/News/Articles/
Garden-Park-A-Catalytic-Project.html
(highlighting
resident
backlash
over
the
Redevelopment Authority of Milwaukee’s failure to communicate a brownfields
redevelopment plan).
258. Delavan Redevelopment Authority, WI, supra note 213; see also Sustainable Reuse—
Ensuring that a Brownfield’s Reuse Offers the Greatest Social, Economic, and Environmental
Benefit to the Community, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), Oct.
2003, available at http://epa.gov/brownfields/success/Green_Sust_Dev.pdf (explaining the
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economy, partnership efforts are a logical way to spur economic
revitalization through brownfields redevelopment. Thus, states should
not ignore the positives of implementing PPPs that take advantage of
economic benefits directly or indirectly related to brownfield-to259
greenspace conversions. Using partnership initiatives with greenspace
redevelopment is consistent with environmental cleanup, job creation,
and local taxability improvements—three key components to successful
260
brownfields redevelopment.
B. The Public–Private Green Space Grant
Present and future provisions must not restrict or dissuade
municipalities with available funding from working with private entities
or facilitating brownfields redevelopment in creative fashions. In fact,
any provision should encourage creativity, innovation, and partnership.
If “brownfield conversions may prosper . . . when the public sector owns
the land in question, local leaders support both the conversion itself and
allocation of the converted land to greenspace, environmental groups get
mobilized, estimates of the costs of maintenance of greenspace are not
261
overestimated, and the federal or state government lends support,”
then the public should obtain an ownership stake in the process and
greenspace should be involved. This Part explains how adjustments to
Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant that would allow for use by PPPs could
program’s intent to encourage cooperation and efficiency throughout the redevelopment
process).
259. Greenspace Uses, supra note 45, at 2. For example, in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, a
$200,000 site assessment grant from the EPA was used to help develop a formerly blighted
industrial site into Riverfront Park. Id. at 1–2. Fitchburg’s Riverfront Park triggered the
development of a major street, parking, a riverwalk, and additional nearby brownfields
cleanup. Id. at 2. Similarly, Jordan Valley Park in Springfield, Missouri, bolstered the
economy of that city. More than the Environment, supra note 10, at 1–2. The Jordan Valley
space was formerly a car dealership and factories, but now houses a public park, civic
building, and an amphitheater, among other features. Id.
260. Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra note 42. States have also used land
banking. “Land banking is the process through which local governments acquire and
assemble properties to ‘bank’ land for short or long-term strategic public purposes.” Silva,
supra note 3, at 614. See generally Tappendorf & Denzin, supra note 54. Through land
banking, communities have turned swaths of blighted land into affordable housing. Silva,
supra, at 619–21 (identifying land banks in St. Louis, Louisville, and Atlanta that developed
low-income and public housing). Similar to brownfields redevelopment, land banking is
hampered by funding restrictions and tax foreclosure laws. Id. at 628. Arguably, these
restrictions prevent economic redevelopment in those areas—especially considering the vast
land segments that land banks are designed for. Id. at 621–22.
261. Brown & Kraft, supra note 119, at 381 (emphasis added).
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better facilitate brownfield-to-greenspace conversions and, generally,
improve opportunities for communities to remediate contaminated
properties.
Projects receiving Green Space Grant funding were supposed to
262
Thus, it seems that
attract businesses and increase property values.
the Grant’s motive was to balance environmental and economic
progress.
Some believe that private investments stimulated by
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions could trigger millions of dollars
263
worth of other improvements, so it seems odd that greenspace-specific
programs would not be taken seriously by the state for future funding
264
Further, when made available, the demand for the Green
purposes.
265
Space Grant was almost twice what the Grant was able to meet, and
municipalities continue to request money for it despite the present lack
266
of funding.
While awarding additional money through the Grant in 2007, former
Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle recognized that brownfield-togreenspace conversions are vital to restoring jobs and increasing
267
property values. Delavan’s Ann Street Corridor and Oshkosh’s Leach
Amphitheater have done just that. Therefore, it seems misguided to not
continue funding the Grant.
Section 173.05(2)(a) of Wisconsin’s Natural Resources Code
maintains that the end use must have a long-term public benefit for
268
If this is the real
parties to receive grant money under that section.
goal of the grants allowable under chapter 173, then, arguably, the
262. Hassett Announces New DNR Grants to Help Clean Up Brownfields for Public Use,
supra note 187. At the Green Space Grant’s inception, former WDNR Secretary Scott
Hassett said that “[t]urning urban brownfields into parks, libraries and soccer fields is as
critical to growing Wisconsin’s economy as other factors,” and acknowledged that the Green
Space Grant “helps communities rid themselves of environmental threats and blighted
structures and replace them with new green spaces and public facilities.” Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
265. Hassett Announces New DNR Grants to Help Clean Up Brownfields for Public Use,
supra note 187.
266. E-mail from Shelley Fox, NR Grant Specialist, Wis. DNR, to author (Jan. 10, 2011,
11:44:00 CST) (providing a list of four Wisconsin cities that have applied for at least $50,000
in funding through the grant, but since no funds are available each city has received nothing).
267. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Doyle Announces $850,000 to
Clean Up Brownfields and Create Public Spaces, Jan. 17, 2007, available at
http://dnr.wi.gov/ORG/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/gs-01-17-07.pdf.
268. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.05(2)(a) (current through 669 Wis. Admin. Reg.
(Oct. 1, 2011)).
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twenty-year provision could impede that goal by being, in fact, too
269
strict. This is especially so if “public benefit” is meant to be broadly
construed, similar to “public improvement” in the subdivision
270
development context described earlier, or if economic activity is
actually a public benefit similar to those activities that have satisfied the
271
Restructuring the
public use doctrine in eminent domain contexts.
twenty-year provision to account for a broader understanding of what a
“public benefit” is could make the Grant more conducive to private
development. This can be done in a couple of ways.
First, the state could leave the deed restriction as is, but maintain
that private entities could own a property held for “public benefit” for
twenty or more years and become eligible for Green Space Grant
funding just as a public body could. This is likely unfeasible because it
would require a very broad interpretation of “public benefit” and also
alterations of other administrative provisions that guide the Green
272
Space Grant’s application. Moreover, private entities are not likely to
develop only greenspace (though, they could, conceivably, use the
funding for solely one portion of a larger development).
Second, the state could mandate that if municipalities utilizing the
Green Space Grant wish to sell a portion of the redeveloped land before
the twenty-year deed restriction passes, they must then maintain a
273
“Greened”
public-use easement over the property for park space.
274
brownfields are frequented by nearby residents and workforce, so a

269. Making the deed restriction in the Green Space Grant more flexible, or even just
allowing its guidelines to be read more liberally, is consistent with suggestions in other states
that say interpreting laws more liberally could help overcome limitations to economic
development. See Reshwan, supra note 54, at 697 (highlighting that the Georgia General
Assembly has suggested that, to encourage effective partnerships that could overcome
economic limitations to development, the Redevelopment Powers Law in Georgia should be
liberally construed).
270. See Rogers Dev., Inc. v. Rock Cnty. Planning & Dev. Comm., 2003 WI App 13,
¶ 13, 265 Wis. 2d 214, 666 N.W.2d 504.
271. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
272. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.03(5). Notably, an “‘[e]ligible project’ means the
remediation and redevelopment of an eligible site or facility that has a long-term public
benefit, including the preservation of green space, the development of recreational areas, or the
use of a property by the local government.” Id. (emphasis added). Though the present
language does not explicitly preclude any private economic development efforts from being
public benefits, it seems that chapter 173 as a whole fails to consider the possibility.
273. Schofield, supra note 113, at 980–82.
274. Christopher De Sousa, Co-Dir. Brownfields Research Consortium, Presentation at
Brownfields
Study
Group
Meeting
13
(May
25,
2010),
available
at
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cooperative effort involving an easement could be put to good use.
More research should be done to determine the feasibility of using
public-use easements to better facilitate private involvement in
brownfields projects while still complying with the base goals of the
Green Space Grant.
Nonetheless, I think the best approach would be to keep the deed
restriction as is, but build on what can be done with the property. If a
municipality develops a brownfield single-handedly, with the goal of
using the brownfield for greenspace and using the Green Space Grant
for cleanup assistance, the twenty-year provision should stay—and at
the end of twenty years, the municipality should be able to do with the
property as it wishes.
However, the municipality should have an option to let a private
entity develop on the property—in a planned context—so long as that
private entity maintains part of the property redeveloped with assistance
by the Green Space Grant, as its designated use, for perpetuity. The
Grant should allow municipalities and private entities to share in the
development of greenspace and, ultimately, allow for part of the land
cleaned up through the Green Space Grant to be converted into taxable,
privately-owned property.
Requiring the portion developed as
greenspace to be kept in that form for perpetuity would ensure that a
“narrowly-read” conception of the public benefit requirement is met
(i.e., a conception that excludes any form of private development from
having a “public benefit”). The idea of maintaining the public benefit
for perpetuity was actually contemplated during the Grant’s planning
275
Thus, it is not
stage before the twenty-year stipulation was set.
unreasonable to consider this option given the benefit a private
developer would receive through added cleanup assistance that is
otherwise unavailable to private entities.
Furthermore, municipalities may consider purchasing and converting
a contaminated lot into greenspace after long-realizing that the lot has
lost potential for development in the private market. Potentially,
developers may become interested in the lot again upon realizing that
cleanup would be paid for with public dollars or by simply noticing the

http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/Org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/bsg/ (highlighting that 72% of survey
respondents visited greened brownfields once per week, while 25% visited daily).
275. See Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141 (the interviewee
mentioned that initially the WDNR considered making the twenty-year provision of the
Green Space Grant a deed restriction for perpetuity).
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effect that the cleaned-up property had on the area’s business potential.
Allowing part of the property to be sold gives municipalities in dire
need of private investment a unique option for economic growth, while
the “in perpetuity” provision ensures that a public benefit will be
maintained. In fact, this could work similar to the alliance approach
276
described in Part III.C: A development could be simultaneously
owned and operated by public and private entities; and the resulting
PPP could make decisions to sell the redeveloped greenspace to other
private entities for private development, or, it could maintain portions
of the land as public greenspace that is publicly maintained while
allowing private developments on the remaining land.
A $200,000 cleanup award may seem minuscule in the big picture,
but that amount could be instrumental to facilitating redevelopment
because one award can trigger more project investment and
277
More importantly, since banks are so reluctant to offer
awareness.
loans for brownfields redevelopments, giving municipalities other
methods to cleanse brownfields for interested private developers may
278
Restructuring the Green Space
help those developers secure loans.
Grant and applicable chapter 173 guidelines to allow private entities to
do what they want with portions of brownfields that are made ready-toreuse, so long as the other part of the plot is maintained as greenspace
for perpetuity, ensures that public benefit exists and fosters privateparty interest. If this provision is implemented, then private entities
could offset cost disincentives, and brownfields might even become
more attractive to developers than greenfields—which, for many
reasons, such as pollution, sprawl reduction, and municipal economic
and job interests, may be an ideal result. Further, allowing a
276. For a description of the alliance approach that is used in some northwestern
European brownfields projects and an example of its use in Nantes, France, see supra Part
III.C and note 134.
277. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141. Particularly, if the
public is willing to spend money on a project, then private investors might become less risk
averse when it comes to investing their own funds, which demonstrates how one award’s
influence could trickle down to other funding sources as well. See Greenspace Uses, supra
note 45, at 2 (highlighting an Atlanta brownfields redevelopment project where one of the
development partners said that a small EPA award helped move the project forward and
“legitimize” the project because the award “showed that [the project] passed a level of
scrutiny in a national competition”).
278. See Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23 (where the interviewee
insisted that the singular commercial development in recent years since the Ann Street
redevelopment began would not have happened without public support because the
developer’s bank was frightened by funding a brownfield project).
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municipality to partition off cleaned-up property that it owns
encourages cost-sharing, promotes efficiency, and alleviates risk—all
279
Because this
marks of successful brownfields remediation efforts.
suggestion is based on the Green Space Grant, the large economic and
even larger environmental benefits of redeveloping brownfields into
greenspace—and the original purpose of the Green Space Grant—are
still in place.
Ultimately, the Green Space Grant must be maintained, not ignored
or stripped of funding. If it is maintained, it should incorporate more
flexible measures, such as those described in Part VI.B.
VII. CONCLUSION
Success obtained by WPRI prompted the WDNR to apply to the
EPA for an additional $1 million to continue funding that initiative. 280
The momentum resulting from WPRI’s success should be used to
promote greenspace initiatives and implement more innovative
greenspace redevelopment measures. The Green Space Grant, when
initially funded, was a creative and innovative approach that helped
spark brownfield cleanup efforts, and the Oshkosh and Delavan success
stories show that marginal funding for small greenspace contributions
can be helpful to certain projects. However, stripping that movement
away by not funding the Green Space Grant crushes any momentum
previously obtained.
Municipalities may shy away from adding greenspace because of the
costs they perceivably incur by maintaining it—especially since many
281
municipalities are currently having trouble funding their park systems.
Yet, Milwaukee has seen over seventy brownfields success cases since
2000, and estimates show that for every $1.00 the city put in, it received
282
Thus, areas plagued by brownfields
$37.00 of private investment.
should strongly consider using their own available funds and grant
packages because private investment likely follows those investments.
279. Van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 149.
280. See Marek & Gore, supra note 179, at 1, 3.
281. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141; see also DE SOUSA,
supra note 5, at 190 (“[T]he financial challenges involved in cleaning up, constructing, and
even justifying the expenditure of funds for greening projects is very difficult given the
budgetary predicaments of many cities and states.”).
282. David Misky, Assistant Exec. Dir.—Sec’y, Redev. Auth. of the City of Milwaukee,
Presentation at the Minn. Brownfields Reclaiming Recalcitrant Brownfields Forum 36 (Nov.
23, 2010), http://assets.mnbrownfields.org/Misky_CityMilwaukee.pdf.
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Whether the budget will provide funds is one aspect, but the laws
that control grant and award packages for potential brownfields
redevelopments must be flexible enough to induce interest and promote
activity.
Wisconsin should attempt to incorporate greenspace
developments and PPPs into its existing brownfields programs, but the
laws must allow for such flexibility—strictly limiting “public benefit”
solely to municipally-operated projects ignores the potential public gains
made by encouraging private involvement, such as increased tax
revenue and jobs. The Oshkosh and Delavan developments show that
marginal greenspace investment by the state can go a long way toward
economic progress in blighted areas—even during an economic
recession. So, even though the Green Space Grant maxes out at
$200,000, using the Grant to help fund PPP efforts could bring a mixture
of public benefit and private investment to struggling areas, with the
potential to trigger economic activity.
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